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This article investigates the determinants of insider trading regulation across countries.  
The article presents a political economy analysis of such regulation that takes into 
account both private (distributional) and public (economic efficiency) considerations.  
The model cannot be tested directly because the relevant private preferences and social 
costs are unobservable.  However, existing theories of capital market development 
suggest that various observable social factors can explain the diversity of insider trading 
policies across countries.  In turn, these social factors should reveal the underlying 
preferences and social costs motivating such regulation. 
 
The main finding, based on data from a cross section of countries between 1980 and 
1999, is that a country’s political system and not its legal or financial system provides the 
first-order explanation of its proclivity to regulate insider trading.  Specifically, more 
democratic political systems enacted and enforced insider trading laws earlier than less 
democratic political systems, controlling for wealth, financial development, legal origin, 
and measures of latent social factors.  In addition, left-leaning governments were relative 
latecomers to insider trading legislation and enforcement relative to right-leaning and 
centrist governments, controlling for the same factors as above.   
 
The findings are consistent with the political theory of capital market development and 
inconsistent with the legal origins theory of capital market development.  They also 
challenge theoretical claims that insider trading restrictions are market-inhibiting because 
the kinds of governments that appear more prone to regulate insider trading are precisely 
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Insider trading regulation has been controversial at least since Professor Henry 
Manne’s theoretical arguments of the 1960s in which he claimed that stock markets were 
more efficient when insiders were allowed to freely trade.  Although it was not until the 
last few years that empirical work challenged the theoretical writing of Manne and 
others1, it is safe to say that insider trading is regarded by many as a threat to stock 
market integrity and efficiency.2  By 2000, eighty-seven countries had enacted insider 
trading legislation and thirty-eight had prosecuted insider trading at least once.3  
However, these laws vary in stringency and many of them were enacted only in recent 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor.  Thanks to Michael Barr, 
John Coffee, Merritt Fox, Don Herzog, Raphael La Porta, Paul Mahoney, Adam Pritchard, Richard Epstein, 
Andrei Shleifer, George Triantis, Detlev Vagts, and especially Richard Lempert.  Thanks also to 
participants in workshops at the University of Michigan Law School, Columbia Law School, and the 
American Law and Association Annual Meeting 2004 for valuable comments and suggestions on various 
drafts.  I am also grateful to Kindra Baer, Jonathan Ho, Stefania Fusco, Alonzo Lagrone, Jorge Luis Silva 
Mendez, Dan Simundza, and Osvaldo Vasquez for excellent research and/or editorial assistance and to 
Michigan Law School Cook and Olin Funds for financial support.  
1 HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Dennis Carlton & Daniel Fischel, 
The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983). 
2 Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Insider Trading Regulation, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 63, 67-68 
(2002). 
3 Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, [ ] (2002); 
Gevurtz, supra note [ ], at 65.   
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decades, often long after the stock markets came into existence.4  Enforcement intensity 
also varies across countries, with some countries regularly enforcing insider trading laws 
and others allowing insiders to trade with impunity notwithstanding the laws on the 
books.5  The question is why.  This article seeks to provide at least a partial answer to 
this question by explaining the differential timing of insider trading legislation a
enforcement across countries between 1980 and 1999.
nd 
                                                
6   
The answer to this question promises to inform the academic debate about insider 
trading regulation, which turns on the question whether such regulation is efficient or 
inefficient.  There are vocal advocates on both sides of the debate.  Those who oppose 
insider trading regulation argue that, at best, it simply redistributes rents among private 
parties at the cost of regulation7and, at worst, reduces market efficiency by distorting 
managerial incentives8 or reducing the accuracy of stock prices.9  In contrast, proponents 
of insider trading regulation argue that such regulation increases market efficiency by 
 
4 See infra Table 3. 
5 See infra Table 3. 
6 In this article, I do not attempt to explain why insider trading legislation and enforcement are phenomena 
of the late 1980s and 1990s.  However, one reason may be that most countries opened up their stock 
markets to foreign investors in 1980 or after.  In addition, technological advances in recent decades have 
increased the level of sophistication of market surveillance, making detection of unusual trading activity 
and thus enforcement of insider trading laws more feasible.  See generally Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement 
of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 26 (1980) (discussing the problems of enforcing insider 
trading laws). 
7 See, e.g., David Haddock & Jonathan Macey, Controlling Insider Trading in Europe and America: The 
Economics of the Politics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL REGULATION 149 (J. 
Matthias Graf von den Schulenburg & Goran Skogh eds., 1986) [hereinafter Haddock & Macey, 
Controlling Insider Trading]; David Haddock & Jonathan Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private 
Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311, [ ] (1987) 
[hereinafter Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand]; Carla Tighe and Ron Michener, The Political 
Economy of Insider-Trading Laws, 84 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 164-168 (1994) (presenting a 
mathematical model supporting Haddock and Macey’s private interest model, id.). 
8 See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at [ ].  
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encouraging broader investor participation, increasing liquidity (share trading), and 
improving share price accuracy.10  
Legal academics not only disagree about the effect of insider trading regulation on 
stock markets, they also disagree about its genesis.  Those who oppose such regulation 
rely on the private interest theory of regulation to explain how these laws, despite their 
inefficiency, are enacted to satisfy influential private interests.11  In contrast, those who 
support insider trading restrictions rely on the public interest theory of regulation to 
explain how insider trading regulation is enacted to address market failures.12  The two 
theories are rarely merged into a single framework.   
However, because insider trading and its regulation concern the distribution of 
property rights to use private corporate information, the issue has both private 
(distributional) and public (efficiency) dimensions.  Both dimensions are taken into 
account in the political economy model in this article.13   The model has elements of both 
private and public interest theories.  Like the private interest theory of insider trading 
regulation, the analysis can accommodate the enactment of inefficient regulation.14  
                                                 
10 See e.g., Reinier Kraakman, The Legal Theory of Insider Trading Regulation in the United States, in 
EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING 39 (Klaus Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1991); Mark Klock, Mainstream 
Economics and the Case for Prohibiting Insider Trading, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 297, [ ] (1994). 
11 See Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note [ ]; David Haddock & Jonathan Macey, A 
Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449, [ ] (1987) [hereinafter Haddock & Macey, 
Coasian Model]. 
12 See, e.g., James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the Chicago School, 
1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 653 (1986). 
13 Many theories of regulation emphasize either an efficiency rationale for regulation or a distributional 
rationale for regulation.  In the spirit of Professor Becker’s article, see Gary Becker, A Theory of 
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983), the model in this 
paper incorporates both rationales.  This approach to the political economy of insider trading legislation 
reflects “the deeper [notion] that the fairness/efficiency debate in insider trading is merely a reprise of the 
public/private debate that characterizes many other areas of political and legal discourse. . . . The place of 
information along [the] public/private continuum is especially problematic because, unlike most other 
valuable objects, information lies particularly close to the imaginary public/private dividing line.”  See also 
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in 
the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV 443, 448 (2001) (parenthetical encouraged). 
14 See infra Part II.C. 
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However, it can also accommodate the enactment of regulation that enhances social 
welfare, even though some private constituencies stand to benefit from such regulation.   
It would be ideal to test the model directly using international data.  However, that 
requires data on the relevant private preferences and social costs across countries.  Such 
data are frequently unobservable in a single country, let alone internationally.  I therefore 
shift to a higher level of generality and discuss several observable factors that existing 
theory suggests can explain the diversity of insider trading policy across countries.  These 
factors, which proxy for the underlying preferences and social costs, are financial 
development, legal origin, political openness, and ideology.  More specifically, the 
investor demand model,15 the legal origins theory of finance,16 and the political theory of 
finance17 suggest that countries with more developed stock markets, common law legal 
systems, and more democratic and right-leaning political systems ought to be more 
inclined to regulate insider trading than other countries.  Examining whether these factors 
correctly predict the enactment and enforcement of insider trading legislation across 
countries may reveal something about the underlying preferences and social costs and 
thus inform the academic debate about insider trading.  
The main finding, based on data I assembled for a cross section of countries 
between 1980 and 1999, is that a country’s political system and not its legal or financial 
system best explains its proclivity to regulate insider trading.  Specifically, more 
democratic political systems enacted and enforced insider trading laws earlier than less 
democratic political systems, controlling for wealth, financial development, legal origin, 
and proxies for latent social factors.  Furthermore, controlling for the same factors, left-
                                                 
15 See infra Part III.A.  
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leaning governments were latecomers to insider trading legislation and enforcement 
relative to right-leaning and centrist governments.   
The findings are consistent with the political theory of capital market 
development and inconsistent with the legal origins theory of capital market 
development.  They also challenge theoretical claims that insider trading restrictions are 
market-inhibiting because the kinds of governments that appear more inclined to regulate 
insider trading are precisely the governments that are generally thought to pursue market-
promoting policies.   
 The article is organized as follows.  Part II presents a political economy model of 
insider trading regulation that integrates both private (distributional) and public 
(efficiency) considerations.  Part III shifts to a higher level of generality and presents four 
empirically testable hypotheses about observable social factors that existing theories 
suggest affect translation of the underlying preferences and social costs into the state’s 
insider trading policy.  I discuss how these factors may explain the differential timing of 
enactment and enforcement of insider trading legislation across countries and thus 
indirectly reveal the unobservable preferences and social costs that motivate insider 
trading regulation.  Part IV explains the empirical methodology.  Part V describes the 
data and presents the results.  Finally, Part VI briefly concludes. 
II. The Political Economy of Insider Trading 
Insider trading legislation concerns the allocation of property rights to use and 
benefit from private corporate information.18   Insider trading laws therefore have an 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 See infra Part III.C. 
18 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING (2007); JONATHAN MACEY, INSIDER 
TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY (1991); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider 
Trading, Markets, and ‘Negative’ Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, (2001); Kimberly 
 8
8
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 81 [2008]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art81
important influence on the distribution of private rents among corporate insiders and 
outsiders.19  When insider trading is unregulated, by default, the state assigns the 
property rights to private corporate information to corporate insiders, enabling them to 
maximize their private rents from the use of such information.  In contrast, when insider 
trading is prohibited, the state removes insiders’ monopoly on the use of private c
information and thus redistributes private rents to outsiders.
orporate 
                                                                                                                                                
20  The preferences and 
relative political influence of insiders and outsiders are important determinants of the 
state’s insider trading policy.  However, insider trading regulation does not just affect the 
distribution of private rents.  It also affects capital market efficiency and thus overall 
economic efficiency.  In this Part, I present a political economy analysis of insider trading 
regulation that integrates both distributional and economic efficiency concerns. 
A. The Private Constituencies: Who Gains and Who Loses from Insider Trading? 
Insider trading creates winners and losers.21  In this section, I consider the likely 
winners and losers. 
1. The Potential Winners: Corporate Insiders 
Corporate insiders include managers, board members, and controlling or large 
shareholders.  Their status gives them privileged access to corporate information and thus 
a probable trading advantage relative to outsiders.  They can earn significant profits from 
insider trading.  Evidence suggests that insiders make superior profits relative to public 
 
Kraweic, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the 
Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443 (2001). 
19 Id. 
20 Effective insider trading laws reduce insiders’ ability to use private corporate information to their 
exclusive benefit.   
21 Some argue that insider trading produces no net gainers or losers.  See, e.g., William J. Carney, 
Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 863, [ ] (1987).  This argument is not 
convincing because, if it was true, insider trading would not be such a controversial political issue.  See, 
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investors and other participants in the stock market even when they trade on the basis of 
publicly available and thus immaterial22 information.23   Insider trading on the basis of 
material, non-public information is probably even more profitable, especially in stock 
markets where there are relatively few constraints on self-dealing by insiders.24  
Professor Arturo Bris, for example, presents international evidence that suggests insider 
trading on the basis of private information about corporate takeovers is very profitable 
and insider trading profits vary inversely with the stringency of insider trading laws.25 
                                                
Some “Chicago” or neoclassical theories of insider trading dismiss the notion that 
insider trading benefits corporate insiders over and above standard compensation.26  They 
argue that insiders do not gain on net, because their salaries are reduced commensurate 
with their trading profits. 27  The argument is not convincing because, by definition, 
insider trading is not transparent.  Furthermore, no evidence has been presented to show 
that those who have been found to have violated insider trading laws were receiving 
lower salaries or other forms of compensation, at the time of transgression, than similarly 
 
22 Immaterial information is generally information that, if publicly known, would not impact the stock’s 
price.  In contrast, material information would, if publicly known, affect the stock’s price.  See, e.g., Basic, 
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, [ ] (1988). 
23 See, e.g., Leslie Jeng et. al., Estimating the Returns to Insider Trading: A Performance-Evaluation 
Perspective, in REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 453 (2003) (applying performance-evaluation 
techniques to reported U.S. insider transactions over 1975-1996 and finding that a constructed portfolio of 
insiders’ purchases earns abnormal returns of approximately 40 basis points per month); Nejat Seyhun, The 
Effectiveness of Insider-Trading Sanctions, 35 J.L. & ECON. 149 (1992) (finding that insiders outperform 
the market in buying and selling their firm’s shares on the basis of public information). 
24 Such constraints may be legal, political, moral, social or institutional. 
25 Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading Laws Work? 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT 267, [ ] (2005).  Bris uses Beny’s 
index of the insider trading law stringency.  Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? 7 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144 (2005) [hereinafter Beny, Do Laws Matter?]. 
26 See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at [ ] (arguing that insiders’ compensation will be reduced 
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situated non-violators.28  Indeed, even in the absence of a legal prohibition, insiders have 
strong incentives to disguise their trading activity.29   
A related argument is that insider trading profits are not a windfall gain but 
simply compensate employees for the entrepreneurial services they provide to the firm.30  
Absent such compensation, the argument goes, employees would have insufficient 
incentives to innovate.31  This argument assumes that insider trading profits are 
observable, an assumption that has yet to be empirically supported.  It also assumes that 
non-innovating employees would refrain from insider trading. 
A final argument is that insiders do not gain from insider trading because they pay 
for insider trading in the form of a higher cost of capital because investors discount share 
prices to reflect the probability of insider trading.32  This too is a theoretical rather than 
empirical proposition and depends on assumptions about information availability that are 
unlikely to be true.  Moreover, even if the argument were true on balance, outsiders may 
underestimate the probability of insider trading in some instances and overestimate it in 
others.  Insiders would be overcompensated in the former case and under-compensated in 
the latter.  In both cases, compensation would be inefficient.  As Professors Bebchuk and 
                                                 
28 However, Roulstone finds evidence of a substitution effect between legal insider trading and total 
compensation: “firms that restrict when insiders can trade pay a 4% to 13% premium in total compensation 
relatives to firms that do not restrict insider trading, after controlling for economic determinants of 
compensation.”  Darren Roulstone, The Relation Between Insider-Trading Restrictions and Executive 
Compensation, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 525, 526 (2003). 
29 See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 50 (arguing that “insiders would prefer to trade anonymously to 
preserve their informational monopolies, even if their activities were legal”).  One solution to this problem 
is to require insiders to disclose their trades, as does Section 16(b) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.  17 C.F.R. § 240.16(b) (2006). 
30 See MANNE, supra note 1, at [ ]. 
31 Id. 
32 See Michael Manove, The Harm in Insider Trading and Informed Speculation, 104 Q. J. ECON. 823 
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Jolls suggest, insider trading may yield a private benefit with costs that are not entirely 
borne by insiders but shared with outsiders who do not benefit.33 
Tippees (relatives, friends, business and political associates of corporate insiders) 
also gain when they trade on the basis of private information received from insiders, and 
no intra-firm dynamics will compensate for their benefits.34  In some countries, much 
insider trading is done by politicians and government bureaucrats who receive private 
information in exchange for economic or political favors.35  Tippees’ insider trading 
profits are a windfall gain since, unlike managers and other primary insiders, they are 
unlikely to increase firm value through entrepreneurial or productive services.  The fact 
that insiders who theoretically may see some of their gains lost to stock price or internal 
compensation adjustments tip outsiders is good evidence that they perceive insider 
trading as a way to extract rents from inside information.36 
2. The Potential Losers: Information, Liquidity Traders, and Small 
Investors 
 
Outsiders who stand to lose from insider trading include information traders, 
liquidity traders and possibly small (i.e., minority) outside investors. 
Information traders receive most of their income from stock trading and are 
insiders’ main competitors for trading profits.  These market participants include market 
professionals, like analysts, broker-dealers, market makers, and other sophisticated 
                                                 
33 Lucian Bebchuk & Christine Jolls, Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth, 15 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 487, [ ] (1999).  How much of the burden is passed on to outsiders depends on how accurately they 
are able to discount share prices to reflect value diversion from insider trading. 
34 Outsiders who receive private information from insiders are often called “tippees.”  See, e.g., Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222, [ ] (1980). 
35 In India, for example, “the broker-promoter--politician-fund manager nexus . . . these days accounts for 
the biggest chunk of insider trading.” Sucheta Dalal, Nabbing Insider Traders: Easier Said Than Done, 
REDIFF, Aug. 16, 2000, http://www.rediff.com/money/2000/aug/16dalal.htm. 
36 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, [ ] (1983); Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational 
Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, [ ] (1979). 
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investors.  While their knowledge or ability to process corporate information is superior 
to those of other outside investors, they experience direct losses from insider trading.  
Informed traders consistently lose relative to insiders when the latter trade on the basis of 
material, non-public information because, although they are well informed relative to 
outsiders, informed traders are at a distinct informational disadvantage vis-à-vis 
insiders.37   
Liquidity traders are investors who trade frequently and thus benefit from low 
trading costs.  They include institutional investors, like pension funds, mutual funds, 
insurance companies, and index traders.  Their trading is largely driven by exogenous 
factors like portfolio realignment or short-term consumption rather than by new 
information.  Theoretical38 and empirical39 studies suggest that insider trading increases 
transaction costs.  Thus, liquidity traders stand to lose from insider trading because they 
trade frequently enough to be harmed by greater transaction costs. 
It is less clear how insider trading affects uninformed, small outside shareholders 
who trade infrequently and own minority equity stakes in firms.  They may be indirectly 
harmed if greater mutual and pension fund fees are passed on to them by institutional 
investors who experience increased trading costs as a result of insider trading.  In 
addition, if insider trading raises agency costs (i.e., causes managers to behave in ways 
                                                 
37 See Nicholas Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure 
Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1993); Goshen & 
Parchomovsky, supra note [ ]; Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note [ ]; Jhinyoung Shin, 
The Optimal Regulation of Insider Trading, 5 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 49 (1996).  In other work, I find a 
positive relationship between the stringency of insider trading laws and stock price informativeness, 
indirectly suggesting that information traders are discouraged by insider trading because stock prices are 
more informative when informed trading activity is vibrant.  Beny, Do Laws Matter?, supra note [ ], at [ ]. 
38 See, e.g., Lawrence Glosten & Lawrence Harris, Estimating the Components of the Bid/Ask Spread, 21 J. 
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that reduce corporate value) and the market systematically underestimates the amount of 
such trading, small outside investors will be harmed by it because they will be buying 
shares at a higher price than their actual value.  In contrast, if insider trading reduces 
agency costs and the market underestimates the amount of such trading, minority 
shareholders will benefit from it because they will be buying shares at a lower price than 
their actual value.40  While the jury is still out, recent evidence suggests that some outside 
shareholders value insider trading restrictions.41 
B. Social Costs: Economic Efficiency Considerations 
Apart from its private distributional effects, theory and evidence suggest several 
ways in which insider trading may be economically inefficient for stock markets and the 
economy as a whole.42  
1. Price Informativeness and Capital Allocation 
Information traders play a positive role in price formation, both in the extent and 
kind of information that is impounded in stock prices.43  They are rewarded for this by 
the profits they earn in trading against less informed investors.  They maximize their 
profits by gathering firm-specific information until the marginal cost exceeds the 
marginal benefit of gathering such information. The collective trading of many such 
                                                                                                                                                 
39 See, e.g., Thomas Copeland & Dan Galai, Information Effects and the Bid-Ask Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457 
(1983); Glosten & Harris, supra note [ ]; Hans Stoll, Inferring the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence, 44 J. FIN. 115 (1989). 
40 In another article, I address the agency implications of insider trading and its regulation.  Laura N. Beny, 
Do Investors in Controlled Firms Value Insider Trading Laws?  International Evidence, J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript, on file with author).  
41 See id.; Art Durnev & Amrita Nain, Does Insider Trading Regulation Deter Private Information 
Trading? International Evidence, PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. (forthcoming 2007). 
42 There is some theoretical work, e.g., MANNE, supra note 1, at [ ]; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at [ ], 
arguing that insider trading is socially beneficial, but I am not aware of any empirical support for this 
claim. 
43 Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at [ ]; Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock 
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traders leads to more efficient capitalization of firm-specific information into stock 
prices,44 making stock prices more informative.45   
Professor Jeffrey Wurgler shows that capital is more efficiently allocated in the 
economy when a greater amount of firm-specific information is capitalized into stock 
prices.46  It thus follows that if insider trading discourages information traders, it imposes 
a negative externality on the economy by reducing the informativeness of stock prices,47 
even if not all traders are discouraged.  Consistent with this, in other work I document a 
positive relationship between stock price informativeness and the stringency of insider 
trading laws. 48  Thus, capital allocation may be less efficient in countries with lax insider 
trading legislation and enforcement.  
2. Capital Constraints and the Cost of Capital 
Capital constraints limit the range of feasible investments in the economy, in turn 
limiting economic growth.49  A lower cost of capital makes investments more profitable 
and encourages the entry of new entrepreneurs into the capital market.  Using 
international time series data, Professors Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk 
demonstrate that the initial enforcement of insider trading legislation is followed by a 5% 
                                                 
44 Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Traders Have Diverse 
Information, 31 J. FIN. 573 (1976); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35 
(1997). 
45  Kenneth French & Richard Roll, Stock Return Variances: The Arrival of Information and the Reaction 
of Traders, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1986); Richard Roll, R2, 43 J. FIN. 541 (1988).   
46 Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (2000). 
47 Morck et al., supra note [ ], at [ ] present cross-country evidence that stock price infomativeness and 
investor protections are positively correlated, implying that beneficial arbitrage activity is greater in 
countries where the threat of expropriation is lower. 
48 Beny, Do Laws Matter?, supra note [ ], at [ ]; see also Nuno Fernandes & Miguel A. Ferreira, Insider 
Trading Laws and Stock Price Informativeness (ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, Working Paper 
No. 161/2007, 2007) (using international data, finds that enforcement of insider trading laws improves 
stock price informativeness). 
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decrease in the cost of capital.50  Their finding suggests that capital is more expensive in 
countries where the public perceives insider trading to be unregulated.  This implies that 
enforcing insider trading legislation could ultimately lead to greater economic growth by 
reducing the cost of capital.   
3. Transaction Costs and Liquidity 
Liquid markets are socially valuable because greater liquidity makes purchasing 
and disposing of shares on short notice at the appropriate price easier for investors.  The 
more liquid the market, the more willing investors should be to participate in it.  
Professors Yakov Amihud and Haim Mendelson confirm that investors value liquidity by 
showing that companies whose shares are more liquid must pay investors a lower 
expected rate of return than companies with less liquid shares.51  In other words, their 
evidence shows that companies with more liquid shares have a lower cost of equity 
capital.  Liquid markets may also mitigate agency costs, by lowering the opportunity cost 
of monitoring and facilitating the market for corporate control.52  As noted above, 
however, evidence suggests that insider trading increases transaction costs and thus 
reduces stock market liquidity.   
In short, there are several potential channels through which insider trading may 
reduce both stock market efficiency and overall economic efficiency. 
                                                 
50 Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note [ ], at [ ]. However, Geert Bekaert et at., Does Financial 
Liberalization Spur Growth?, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 3, [ ] (2005) show that the positive effect of enforcing 
insider trading laws on the cost of capital is not robust to controlling for stock market liberalization (i.e., a 
country’s opening its stock market to foreign investors). 
51 Yakov Amiuhud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 223 
(1986). 
52 Markus Berndt, Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems, in KONOMISCHE ANALYSE DES 
RECHTS [Economic Analysis of Law] 3 (Peter Behrens et al. eds., 2002); Ernst Maug, Insider Trading 
Legislation and Corporate Governance, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 1569, [ ] (2002). But see Amar Bhide, The 
Hidden Costs of Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 31 (1993) (arguing that greater liquidity hinders 
corporate monitoring).  
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C. A Political Economy Model of Insider Trading Regulation 
 
According to the public interest theory of regulation, governments intervene in 
markets to correct their failures and thus promote efficiency.53  From this perspective, 
insider trading regulation can be seen as an attempt by the government to address a 
market failure that market participants are unwilling or unable to solve through private 
contracting.54  A fundamental weakness of the public interest theory of regulation, 
however, is that it is vague about the mechanisms through which a social desire to correct 
a market failure gets translated into public policy.55  Thus, for example, the mere fact that 
insider trading may be thought to be inefficient does not lead to the automatic enactment 
of insider trading legislation.  Market inefficiencies can persist for long periods without 
governmental intervention, due not just to the costs of regulation but also to effective 
opposition to reform from private parties who stand to lose from insider trading 
regulation.  The private interest theory of regulation is also deficient in that it tends to 
consider competition between special interest groups as the sole determinant of who wins 
the regulatory game. 56  Theorists of this stripe generally view regulatory intervention as 
                                                 
53 Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974) (reviewing 
theories of regulation, including public interest theory).   
54 See, e.g., Cox, supra note [ ], at 653; see also Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public Enforcement of 
Securities Laws: Preliminary Evidence (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (comparing 
public and private enforcement of securities laws). 
55 Posner, supra note [ ], at [ ]; see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, THE GRABBING HAND: 
GOVERNMENT PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES 10 (1998) (“[I]nstitutions supporting property rights are 
created not by the fiat of a public-spirited government but, rather, in response to political pressure on the 
government exerted by owners of private property.”).  But see Steven P. Croley, Public Interested 
Regulation, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, [ ] (2000) (parenthetical encouraged). 
56 E.g., Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, [ ] (1976); 
George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).  David 
Haddock and Jonathan Macey apply this type of model to insider trading regulation, and argue that insider 
trading legislation is the result of demand from powerful special interests. Haddock & Macey, Regulation 
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inefficient, seemingly overlooking the empirical reality that regulation sometimes does 
enhance economic efficiency.57  
As Professor Gary Becker recognizes, the impetus for policy change lies 
somewhere between public and private interest theories of regulation.58  Becker 
integrates the two approaches in a model of interest-group competition.59  In his model, 
consistent with the private interest theory of regulation, interest groups support pol
that maximize their private rents.  Those with the most at stake do not automatically 
prevail, however.  Who prevails among private constituencies depends on several facto
that influence the relative efficiency of their political expenditures, such as group wea




                                                
60  It also depends on the social welfare 
implications of the competing preferences.  This is the novel aspect of Becker’s model: 
social welfare plays an explicit role in the outcome of competition among private parties.  
Specifically, efficiency enters the model in that an interest group has an inherent 
 
57 Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, Coase versus the Coasians, 116 QUARTERLY 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 853 (2001) aptly note how the Coasians are more Coasian than Coase was 
himself.  They also show how securities laws can increase economic efficiency.  See also Simeon Djankov, 
Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silances & Andrei Shleifer, The New Comparative 
Economics, 31 JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS 595-619, 607, 612-613 (2003) (“not all institutional 
failure should be blamed on politics.  In fact, politics often moves societies toward institutional efficiency 
rather than away from it…..even when some interest groups obstruct change, Coasian bargaining often 
leads to efficient institutional choice” and citing U.S. progressive reforms as example of efficiency-
increasing regulation); Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2000) 
(arguing that regulation may sometimes be in the public interest, i.e., increase economic efficiency); SUSAN 
M. PHILLIPS AND J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 25 (1981) (leaning toward 
public choice (private interest) theory of regulation but acknowledging that public choice and efficiency 
might in some cases merge: “Even if all the SEC regulatory programs were to conform to the public choice 
model, for example, it is still interesting to ask whether a particular program such as corporate disclosure is 
in the public interest in the sense that it advances economic efficiency”). 
58 Becker, supra note [ ], at [ ]; see also Croley, supra note [ ], at [ ] (parenthetical suggested). 
59 Becker, supra note [ ], at [ ]. 
60 Smaller, more cohesive groups are often thought to be more influential than larger groups because they 
are better able to control free-riding among their members.  See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (parenthetical strongly encouraged).  However, having a smaller size need not 
always give a group a political advantage.  Professor Becker’s model illustrates that more members may 
increase the effective influence of special interest groups, if the scale effect outweighs the free riding effect 
of an increase in group size.  Becker, supra note [ ], at [ ]. 
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advantage in the competition if its preferred policy raises social welfare and an inherent 
disadvantage in the competition if its preferred policy lowers social welfare.61    
Becker’s framework can be applied to the contest over insider trading 
regulation.62  The status quo ante is unregulated insider trading.  Corporate outsiders – 
information and liquidity traders and small outside investors – who may seek to overturn 
the status quo must prevail upon the state to enact and enforce insider trading legislation.  
Insiders will resist insider trading regulation through various means, including monetary 
payments to politicians and, importantly, information tip-offs to politicians and market 
professionals.  If insiders are able to co-opt market professionals, who include 
information and liquidity traders, they may easily succeed in maintaining the status quo 
because in many stock markets small outside investors are a relatively unorganized group 
whose relatively small individual stakes provide little financial incentive to lobby.63  
Thus, on the face of it, it seems as though corporate insiders could often easily defeat 
insider trading regulation.   
 However, applying Becker’s integrated public-private framework, insider 
prevalence cannot be taken for granted.  If insider trading is inefficient, as it may be in 
some markets, insiders will be inherently disadvantaged in the competition over 
                                                 
61 A group that favors an inefficient policy may overcome its inherent disadvantage if it is able to exert 
greater political influence than the competing group.   
62 In the Appendix, I present a formal, albeit highly stylized model of competition between insiders and 
outsiders for influence over a government regulator who sets insider trading policy.  The model assumes 
that insiders prefer to trade with impunity while outsiders prefer a ban on insider trading.  As in Professor 
Becker’s model, an interest group has an inherent advantage if the policy that it favors raises social welfare 
and an inherent disadvantage if its preferred policy is socially inefficient.  It is not necessary to read the 
model to follow the rest of the article. 
63 However, normative factors, like a sense of what is fair, may cause small investors to have strong 
feelings about the matter.  Furthermore, as the investor class in a country expands, outside investors may 
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regulatory policy relative to outsiders.  While they may be able to overcome this 
disadvantage in some social contexts, they may not be able to do so in others. 
III. Testable Hypotheses 
While it would be ideal to test the political economy model in Part II directly, 
direct data on the relevant private preferences and social costs are unavailable across 
countries.  Thus, in this Part, I switch to a greater level of generality and focus on three 
observable factors – financial development, law, and politics.  Existing theories suggest 
that these factors can explain the diversity of insider trading policy across countries.  In 
the process they may reveal something about the preferences and social costs underlying 
such policy.64  In this Part, I discuss these theories and present four testable hypotheses. 
A. Finance: The “Investor Demand” Model65 
As the stock market develops, outside investors may become more effective at 
exerting political pressure on the state to adopt greater investor protections, including 
insider trading regulation.66  There are several channels through which this may occur.  
First, as the size of the domestic investor class increases, their wealth and influence 
becomes more important relative to those of insiders.  Outside investor’s influence may 
increase even more relative to insiders’ if their numbers consist of foreign investors, who 
reside or invest primarily in countries where restrictions on insider trading are the 
                                                 
64 See Figure 1 for a model of causality from preferences to insider trading policy. 
65 See generally PETER A. GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL 96-
123 (2005) (“In the investor model, the owners of firms and external providers of capital work out a ‘good 
governance’ bargain through a combination of private ordering and public regulations, thus providing 
protections for minority shareholders.”). 
66 See, e.g.,Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development, and 
Politics, 4 JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 315-341 (2006) (presenting a model with 
mutual feedback between stock market development and investor protection, where greater investor 
protection leads to a broader stock market, which in turn broadens the shareholder base and increases 
political support for shareholder protections). 
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norm.67  Second, as stock markets develop, institutions may emerge to mitigate the free-
riding problems that stymie collective action by small outside investors.68  Investor 
associations are an important example.  In the United States, for example, the Investor’s 
Clearinghouse is an online forum run by the Alliance for Investor Education
website disseminates information to dispersed investors on a wide variety of topics o
concern, such as the determinants of mutual fund fees.   
As the stock market develops, market professiona
.69  The 
f 





                                                
e and display interests distinct from those of corporate insiders.  Institutional 
investors, for example, may begin to share information on issues of collective concern
like corporate governance and securities fraud.  One U.S. example is Institutional 
Investor Online.70  The site provides articles about a range of issues of concern to 
institutional investors, like the dangers of investing in overseas markets, like China
are rife with insider trading and market manipulation.71  The international edition of the 
Institutional Investor Online,72 monitors corporate performance in many countries, 
including emerging markets, like Brazil and India, and often ranks companies based
 
azine.com/default.aspx?theme=International 
(last visited January 21, 2008). 
67 Professors Bakaert, Harvey and Lundblad argue that “[i]t is possible that the enactment of [insider 
trading] rules are particularly valued and perhaps demanded by foreigners before they take the risk of 
investing in emerging markets.”  Bekaert et at., supra note [ ], at 27.  The internationalization of stock 
markets has led to a proliferation of regulatory harmonization efforts among countries (e.g., through the 
auspices of institutions like the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and 
bilateral agreements between the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and foreign market 
regulators).  Arguably, this has generated a “race-to-the-top” in the sense that many countries have agreed 
to amend their laws in order to satisfy minimum standards of securities regulation.  
68 In the theoretical model in Appendix, mechanisms that reduce free riding problems are considered to 
increase the “productivity” of political expenditures.  See also Becker, supra note [ ], at [ ] (parenthetical 
encouraged). 
69 The Investor’s Clearinghouse, http://www.investoreducation.org/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).  
70 Institutional Investor, http://www.iimagazine.com/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).   
71 See, e.g., Kevin Hamilton, Laissez Regulators, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 25, 2002, http://www. 
iimagazine.com/article.aspx?articleID=1036391.  
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their corporate governance practices.73  Finally, an innovative U.S. example is the 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse jointly run by Stanford Law School and 
Cornerstone Research, a private consulting firm.74  The clearinghouse, in operation since 
1996, provides individual and institutional investors with unprecedented access to class 
action securities fraud litigation documents that would otherwise be private.   
Stock exchanges, seeking to maximize trading volume and thus commissions, 
may begin to engage in self-regulation long before formal legislative action is taken.75  
This occurred in the U.S. and the United Kingdom as their stock markets were 
developing.  Private stock exchanges in the two countries regulated their members, which 
include stock-issuing firms and market professionals like brokers-dealers, imposing 
listing requirements and disclosure and anti-manipulation rules.76  In turn, self-regulation 
by market professionals may stimulate legislative action that leads to formal stock market 
regulation.  As Professor Coffee observes, private parties may eventually perceive self-
regulation to be insufficient because of enforcement deficiencies: 
[e]ven when a strong private institutional structure exists (as it did in the case of 
the NYSE), there are still important deficiencies which require legislative 
intervention in order to provide adequate enforcement.  …the enforcement 
shortfall that is inherent in a self-regulatory system [is due to] several different 
                                                 
73 See, e.g., “Institutional Investor Releases Inaugural Ranking of Asia’s Top Executives and Shareholder-
Friendly Companies,” INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, http://www.iimagazine.com/RankingsAsiaTopExec.aspx 
(last visited January 21, 2008) (releasing a survey of investors and portfolio managers that “ranks the top 
executives and companies in Asia, showing which are most effective in satisfying investors with straight 
talk, open and honest reporting and top-notch investor relations”). 
74 Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, http://securities.stanford.edu/ (last visited January 21, 2008). 
75 John Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of 
Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, [ ] (2001).  According to Professor Coffee, “[b]y a variety of 
means, including a substantial self-regulatory component, both the United States and the United Kingdom 
developed legal and institutional mechanisms that enabled dispersed ownership to persist.  Generally, these 
mechanisms followed, rather than preceded, economic changes, but they did protect and facilitate the 
growth of dispersed ownership.”  Id. at [ ]; see also Brian Cheffins, Does Law Matter?  The Separation of 
Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, [ ] (2001) (parenthetical 
encouraged) 
76 See Coffee, supra note [ ], at [ ] (“By the 1950s, the [London Stock Exchange’s] listing rules had been 
tightened to require issuers to reveal all material information on an ongoing basis.”).  
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reasons: (1) A private body has weak incentives to enforce rules against its own 
members and clients; (2) Enforcement is too costly for a private body to 
undertake on a thorough-going basis; and (3) Private bodies necessarily lack the 
investigative tools and punitive sanctions that the State has at its disposal 77
 
.  
Thus, as the stock market increases in significance, constituencies that favor liquidity and 
 




likely t  
Hypothesis 1 
                                                
an orderly market may increase private demand for regulatory oversight that is likely to 
include insider trading legislation and enforcement.  Furthermore, as these constituencies
become more organized and resource-endowed they should pose a greater political threat 
to the insider-dominated status quo. 
 The social cost of insider trad
efficiency case for insider trading legislation as the stock market develops.  Insider 
trading becomes more profitable and thus more tempting as stock markets become m
liquid and efficient.78  Because equity finance is more important to the economy, this 
raises the potential social cost of insider trading.  Applying the model developed in Pa
II, this implies an increase in outside investors’ relative advantage (or a decrease in their 
relative disadvantage) in the political competition over insider trading policy.   
In summary, as the stock market develops, both private and public force
o bring insider trading policy to the forefront of legislative debate and increase
outsiders’ ability to challenge the insider-dominated status quo.79  These observations 
lead to the first prediction: 
 
 
79 s likely to follow, rather than precede, the 
appearance of securities markets because a constituency of public investors must first arise before there will 
be pressure for legislative reform that intrudes upon the market.”).  
77 Id. at [ ]. 
78 Bris, supra note [ ], at [ ]; Maug, supra note [ ], at [ ]. 




Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2008
A country with a more developed stock market is more likely to enact and enforce insider 
However, the country’s legal and political systems will constrain outsiders’ ability to 
overcome the status quo.  These potential constraints are addressed in the next two 
sections. 
B. Legal Origins 
Although it is coming under increasing intellectual scrutiny and empirical 
challenge, legal origins theory is an influential movement.   The central claim of the 
theory is that the main predictor of financial development is a country’s legal origin.  
Fundamental differences between common law and civil law systems, so the theory 
posits, yield fundamental differences in investor protection laws, which then produce 
different levels of financial development. 
More specifically, the legal origins theory of finance claims that “common law 
countries protect [outside] shareholders better than do civil law countries.”   Thus, small 
investors are more willing to invest in common law countries than in civil law countries, 
where they fear being robbed by insiders and large shareholders.  The result is that 
common law countries develop deep stock markets with diffuse ownership, while stock 
markets in civil law countries remain shallow and firms must rely on traditional forms of 




                                                 
80 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, [ ] (1998) [hereinafter La 
. 
nce in 
).  The 
“over-regulation” of markets in civil law countries.  Id. at 471-474.  
Porta et al., Law and Finance]; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN
1131, [ ] (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants].  For critiques of the legal origins 
approach, see GOUREVITCH &  SHINN, supra note [ ], at 85-87; Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Fina
Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 325, [ ] (2000); Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and 
Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 462, 470-82 (2006) [hereinafter Roe, Legal Origins]. 
81 Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, supra note [ ], at [ ] n.13 (citing Simeon Djankov et al., supra note [ ]
mechanisms that are believed to drive the legal and financial differences between common law and civil 
law countries are the existence of fiduciary duties in common law systems and their absence in civil law 
systems, the supposedly greater flexibility of common law judges compared to civil law judges, and the 
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finance, like banks, related firms, and founding families.82  Stock ownership and control 
thus tends to be highly concentrated in civil law countries, according to the legal family 
theory.83  
In turn, these divergent markets structures foster different power relations 
betwee ing to 
le to 
gests that there will be a greater efficiency 
impera han 
 
common law countries will be more responsive to this need because an important premise 
n insiders and outsiders in the two legal systems.  Outside investors, accord
the theory, have greater power relative to corporate insiders in common law countries 
than they do in civil law countries.84  The theory implies that in civil law countries 
corporate insiders and dominant shareholders are likely to pose a formidable obstac
outsiders seeking the enactment and enforcement of insider trading legislation.85  That is 
the private interest side of the equation. 
On the public side, the theory sug
tive for insider trading regulation and enforcement in common law countries t
in civil law countries.  As noted in the preceding section, as the stock market develops 
and equity finance becomes more important to the national economy, the public interest
case for insider trading regulation is likely to increase.  Legal origin theory suggests that 
                                                 
82 La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ], at [ ]; La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note [ ], 
at [ ]. 
83 La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ], at [ ]; La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note [ ], 
at [ ]. But see Roe, Legal Origins, supra note [ ], at 495-501 (2006); Sonja Fagernäs, Prabirjit Sarkar & Ajit 
Singh, Legal Origin, Shareholder Protection and the Stock Market: New Challenges from Time Series 
Analysis, CENTRE FOR BUSINESS RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE WORKING PAPER NO. 343 (2007) 
(casting doubt on the claim that common law countries have stronger shareholder protection, which leads to 
greater stock market development, using data on sixty annual legal indicators for the period 1970-2005 for 
France, Germany, the UK and the US). 
84 Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 
Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5, [ ] (2003); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection: Origins, 
Consequences, Reform (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7428, 1999). 
85 See Maug, supra note [ ], at [ ], demonstrating that controlling shareholders benefit when insider trading 
laws are lax.  In a similar vein, Harold Demsetz, Corporate Control, Insider Trading and Rates of Return, 
76 AM. ECON. REV. 313, [ ] (1986) and Bhide, supra note [ ], at [ ], argue that insider trading legislation 
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of the theory is that common law systems are more adaptive to “the changing needs of 
society”.86  The common law is thought to be more accommodating of modernization 
because common law judges have greater flexibility than civil law judges.  Common law
is also said to be more market-promoting than civil law.
 
onse to private and public 
demand
A common law country is more likely to enact and enforce insider trading legislation than 
t. 
 
The political theory of finance emphasizes the centrality of politics to stock 
market development.89  According to the theory, state policy toward the stock market is 
                                                
87   
In summary, legal origins theory suggests that common law countries are more 
likely to enact and enforce insider trading legislation in resp
 than civil law countries.88  This is the second prediction:  
Hypothesis 2 
a civil law country with the same level of stock market developmen
C. Politics 
 
86 This is the dynamic “law and finance theory”: 
 
The common law is inherently dynamic as it responds case-by-case to the changing needs 
portunities for large gaps to grow between the 
demands of society and the law.  Since laws must evolve efficiently to support financial 
 
Thorsten hed 
manuscri  author). See also Coffee, supra note [ ], at [ ].  (“[T]he more decentralized 
haracter of common law legal institutions [perhaps] facilitated the rise of both private and semi-private 
ic 
arco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 95 AM. ECON. 
e, 
o Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000) 
of society.  This tends to limit the op
development, the dynamic law and finance view predicts that common law is particularly 
effective in supporting financial institutions.  Moreover, the inherently dynamic nature of 
the common law implies that countries that received the common law have received a 
legal tradition that will more naturally adapt to different socioceconomic conditions and 
more readily evolve with changing commercial requirements than countries with the 
French civil law.  
 Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, & Ross Levine, Law, Politics, and Finance 17 (2001) (unpublis
pt, on file with the
c
self-regulatory bodies in the U.S. and the U.K., whereas in civil law systems the state retained a relative 
monopoly over law-making institutions.”). 
87 See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right, 30 J. Legal 
Stud. 503, [ ] (2001) (arguing that civil law countries poorly protect property rights, thus stifling econom
growth). 
88 But see Roe, Legal Origins, supra note [ ], at 472 (noting that insider trading was legal in most U.S. 
states at common law). 
89 E.g., M
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 challenging the status quo 
(unregu
succession, but are quite vulnerable to manipulation by elites and special 
nd 
ignorance can all contribute to a system unable to enforce its rules and 
cure, and [outside 
stock ownership] will not take place.  
                                                                                                                                                
olitical game and ideology.90  I focus on the last two factors in this section.  
Regarding the first, Professors Gourevitch and Shinn write: “[t]o obtain the most 
advantageous rules each player needs a way of getting the political system to reflect its 
preferences.”91  Regarding the second, Professor Roe states bluntly: “[t]he first orde
condition is a polity that supports capital markets.”92  
The political theory of finance suggests that outsiders are more likely to get the 
political system to reflect their preferences in democracies than in authoritarian states.
Outsiders should have significantly greater difficulty in
lated insider trading, or an as yet non-enforced insider trading ban) in countries 
with relatively closed and undemocratic political systems because insiders, the 
incumbents, have more sway with the state in such systems.93  
Weak democracies have formalized elections and means of leadership 
interest groups.  Money, guns, poverty, weak civil service systems, a
regulations…. In a corrupt democracy, investors feel inse
94
 
[hereinafter Roe, Political Preconditions]; Mark Roe, Rents and their Corporate Law Consequences, 53 
 
r 
e, Legal Origins, supra note [ ], at 464. 
overnments become massively redistributive when there 
 few very powerful groups with different interests, not when there are many relatively weak 
e also Mara Faccio, Ronald Masulis, & John McConnel, 
k 
itive 
STAN. L. REV. 1463 (2001); Lucian Bebhcuk & Zvika Neeman, Corporate Governance and Interest Group
Politics (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Levine, supra note 
[ ]. 
90 See e.g., GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note [ ], at 58 (“Policy . . . is the output of preferences and powe
resources mediated by political institutions.”). 
91 Id. at 57. 
92 Ro
93 According to Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 222, [ ] (1999) 
[hereinafter La Porta, Quality of Government], “[g]
are relatively
groups each pushing in its own direction.” Se
Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts, 61 J. FIN. 2597 (2006) (finding that governments are 
significantly more likely to bail out politically connected firms than non-connected firms, using data from 
thirty-five countries between 1997 and 2000); Mara Faccio & David Parsley, Sudden Deaths: Taking Stoc
of Political Connections (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding a significant pos
association between firms’ political connections and their values).  
94 GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note [ ], at 81; see also Daron Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase 
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In c er 
cha
The political theory of finance also suggests that outsiders are more likely to get 






ontrast, when the political process is open and contestable, outsiders have a great
nce of influencing national policy.95 
the political system to reflect their preferences under right-leaning and centrist 
governments than under left-leaning gov
, Professor Roe poses the pivotal questions: “Who has power?  Do they like 
capital markets, do they dislike them, or are they indifferent to them?”96  In the 
left-leaning governments tend to eschew investors and capital market regulation and 
focus on workers and labor market regulation.  Such neglect of capital markets does
necessarily stem from hostility toward capital owners, although it may.97  The importan
                                                                                                                                               
checks and balances on the ruling elite). 
95 See Enrico Perotti & Paolo Volpin, The Political Economy of Entry: Lobbying and Financial 
Development (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (“investor protection improve[s] when 
the…political system becomes more accountable”); Bebchuk & Neeman, supra note [ ], at 26-27 (showing 
that investor protection improves when politicians are less susceptible to special interest lobbying).  The 
U.S is a good example.  The U.S. political process is sufficiently open to enable outsiders to mount 
ative procedures also encourage 
 and 
ts into regulatory policy. U.S. Securities and Exchange 
s 
a 
rvention in financial markets, arguing that for 
ate intervention than Americans. 
(2003) (presenting a theoretical analysis that suggest that policies will be less inefficient, the greater are the 
successful challenges (e.g., the insider trading prohibition or the recent Sarbanes Oxley Act) against 
corporate constituencies (insiders) with some frequency.  Administr
outsiders to participate in rulemaking.  For example, the U.S. SEC posts proposed rules on its website,
solicits comments from interested parties; the publication of proposed rules and solicitation of public 
comments creates a forum for discussion among interested groups and plays an important role in the 
translation of market participants’ interes
Commission, How to Submit Comments on SEC Rulemaking, http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
submitcomments.htm (last visited Jan 25, 2008). 
96 Roe, Legal Origins, supra note [ ], at 511 fig.6. 
97 Roe notes that “[i]n social democracies – nations…whose governments play a large role in the 
economy, emphasize distributional considerations, and favor employees over capital-owners when 
the two conflict – public policy emphasizes managers’ natural agenda and demeans shareholders’ 
natural agenda.”  Roe, Political Preconditions, supra note [ ], at 3–4.  Professor Roe maintains 
that social democracies “do not want unbridled shareholder wealth maximization, and, hence 
[emasculate] shareholder wealth maximization institutions.”  Id. at 4.  Professor Coffee disagrees, 
arguing that a more “feasible political explanation is . . . that power seeking nationalists could use 
banks as their agents and that banks, once entrenched, had natural reason to resist the rise of rival
for their business.” Coffee, supra note [ ], at 53.  La Porta et al., Quality of Government, supr
note [ ], at [ ], also emphasize the role of state inte
historical and cultural reasons Europeans support greater St
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point is that left-oriented states and legislatures tend to devote their political energy and 
resources to labor-protective redistributive policies.98   
Roe’s labor model suggests that left-leaning governments are less likely to 
redistri  and 
 
ions in this section yield the article’s final predictions:  
 
 country with a more democratic political system is more likely to enact and enforce 
egislation than a country with a less democratic political system with the 
 country with a left-leaning government is more likely to enact and enforce insider 
trading legislation than a country with a right-leaning government and the same level of 
stock market development.  
sider 
islation.  
bute property rights in inside information from the corporate elite (managers
dominant shareholders) and their associates to outside investors than right-leaning or 
centrist governments.  In fact, keeping corporate information inside the firm may be an











Hypotheses 1-3 are summarized in Table 1.  
 
IV. Methodology – Duration Analysis 
The regression analysis covers countries that had not enacted or enforced in
trading legislation as of 1980.  I first examine the enactment of insider trading leg
                                                 
98 Roe supports this claim with empirical evidence that shows an inverse correlation between labor power 
and investor protections and ownership diffusion, a common measure of stock market development.  Roe, 
Legal Origins,  supra note [ ], at 497. But see Paul Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Te
Competing Hypotheses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229, [ ] (2003) (finding that the progressive lobby strongly 
influenced th
st of 
e adoption of securities regulation by forty-seven of the forty-eight U.S. states between 1911 
 on 
neurs and 
and 1931).  
99 In the corporatist model of sectoral conflict, corporate insiders and workers may align to ensure that both 
are entrenched.  See, e.g., GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note [ ], at 64-65 (“[S]olidarities are often based
sectors, on ‘bosses and workers’ within a particular business sector who share interests, along with the 
inside blockholders who join them.”).  See also Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, The Political Economy of 
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The null hypothesis is that in any given year between 1980 and 1999, all countries that 
 
lone determined whether a country would move from the group of countries with no 
sider trading laws to the group that had enacted such laws.  The alternative hypothesis 
is that this process was not random, but that because of country-specific conditions some 
countries had a greater probability of enacting insider trading legislation than others in 
any particular year between 1980 and 1999.  More specifically, I have postulated that 
finance, law and politics affect the likelihood that a country will move from “have not” to 
“have” status with respect to insider trading legislation.  Thus, I test both the proposition 
that the time to adopting insider trading legislation, given that a country had no such 
legislation in 1980, was non-random and that the time to adoption can be explained by 
the factors identified in my hypotheses. 
There are compelling reasons to think that enforcement rather than enactment is 
the real turning point for a country’s stock market.  Enforcement, because it requires an 
expenditure of scarce resources, demonstrates political and legal will to give the insider 
trading prohibition teeth.   In contrast, the enactment of insider trading legislation may 
be relatively costless.  Thus, I also examine the timing of enforcement.  I take two 
approaches.  First, I examine the probability that a country enforced insider trading 
legislation between 1980 and 1999.  Under this approach, the question is: what 
determined how soon after 1980 a country initially enforced insider trading legislation?  
  




                                                                                                                                               
workers can strike a political agreement by which low investor protection is exchanged for high 
employment protection”). 
100 See, e.g., Jackson & Roe, supra note [ ], at [ ] (comparing allocation of public and private resources for 
enforcement of securities laws across countries).  See generally Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in 
Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 325, [ ] (2000) (discussing the need for complementary local 
legal institutions to give “transplanted laws” teeth). 
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Framed this way, the question implicitly assumes that the meaningful switch from “have 
not” to “have not” status occurs not when a country enacts insider trading legislatio
when it enforces such legislation for the first time.  Second, I examine the probabilit
a country enforced insider trading legislation between the year of enactment and
The question here is: what determined how long it took a country to put its insider trading
legislation to work?  In both cases, as for enactment, I simultaneously test whether the 
time to enforcing insider trading legislation was non-random and whether it can be 
explained by the factors identified in my hypotheses. 
I examine these issues through duration or survival analysis.
n but 
y that 








101  This technique 
seeks to identify for each point in time the probability that a nation will move to the 
group of “have” countries rather than “survive” as a member of the “have not” group of
countries.  In duration or survival analysis the hazard rate, h(t), is the probability or 
that an event occurs at a particular time, t, given that it
ed above, I am interested in three hazard rates: (1) the probability or “risk” that a 
country had passed insider trading legislation in year t, given that it had not yet passe
such legislation as of 1980; (2) the probability or “risk” that a country had enforced its 
insider trading legislation for the first time in year t, given that it had not yet enforced 
such legislation as of 1980; and (3) the probability or “risk” that a country had enforc
its insider trading legislation for the first time in year t, given that it had not yet enforced 
such legislation since enacting it. 
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I test whether the three hazard rates are influenced by the hypothesized factors, 
i.e., whether the probability or “risk” of the event in question (enactment or enforcemen
varies with country-level financial, legal and political factors.  I use a Weibull 
proportional hazards regression, which has the following form:  
,[th
t) 
ttht o ]b)'(xexp[)(]b),(x =  (1) 
where h
quals  
ptp-1, where p is a parameter estimated from the data.102  The model assumes that the 
hazard rates are independent across countries, but not within countries over time.  The 
The Weibull regression is convenient because it lends itself to intuitive 
(t) is the hazard rate at time t, b is a vector of maximum-likelihood regression 
coefficients to be estimated by the model, x is a vector of independent or explanatory 
variables, and ho(t) is the baseline hazard rate.  The baseline hazard rate, ho(t), e
model is also dynamic in that it follows each country over time and therefore permits the 
social context (e.g., financial development and politics) to vary over time.   
interpretation.  In particular, a transformation of equation (1) yields the following 
relationship: 
ebxT += ')ln(  (2) 
Equation (2) means that the log of the expected time (denoted as T) to the event of 
interest e 
ear 
’s enactment or initial enforcement of insider trading legislation.  The 
regression coefficients, b, signify the percentage ch nge in expected time to enact or 
initially enforce insider trading legislation for a one-unit change in the corresponding 
 is a linear function of the explanatory variables and an error term.  In th
regressions I estimate, for example, T is the expected time in years from the base y
until a country
a  the 
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explanatory variable.  Thus, a positive b implies that an increase in the explanatory 
variable increases the expected time to or “risk” of the enactment or initial enforce
of insider trading legislation.  Conversely, a negative b means that an increase in the 
explanatory variable decreases the expected time to or “risk of” the enactment or initi
enforcement of insider trading legislation.
ment 
al 
and the control variables (to hold other 
relevant factors constant).
 Daouk sent a survey to the national 
ange in each country with a stock market.104   Their survey 
ion and 
on 
rvey to determine the timing of a country’s enactment and 
enforcement of insider trading legislation.   
                                                                                                                                                
103  
V. Data and Results 
In this Part, I describe the data on which I test Hypotheses 1-3 (see Table 1 for a 
summary of the hypotheses) and present the results. 
A. Data Description 
This section describes three sets of variables: the dependent variables, the 
explanatory variables (to test the hypotheses), 
 
1. Dependent Variables  
In the late 1990s, Professors Bhattacharya and
regulator and main stock exch
posed two simple questions: (1) when did the country enact insider trading legislat
(2) when did the country enforce such legislation for the first time?  I use the informati
they gathered from their su
 
102 See Kiefer, supra note [ ], at [ ]. 
lds a negative coefficient on civil law origin when I estimate equation 
 law 
ng 
k, supra note [ ]. 
103 For example, if the regression yie
(2) for the time to enacting insider trading legislation, the appropriate interpretation would be that on 
average civil law countries are at a greater “risk” of enacting such laws, or enact earlier, than common
countries.  Conversely, if the regression yields a positive coefficient on civil law origin, the appropriate 
interpretation would be that on average civil law countries are at a lesser “risk” of enforcing insider tradi
laws, or enforce later. 
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2. Explanatory Variables 
Hypothesis 1. To measure stock market development, I use three variables: stock 
market capitalization relative to gross domestic product (GDP), stock market turnover, 
which is the total value of shares traded relative to stock market capitalization, and the 
total value of stocks traded relative to GDP.  The first variable, stock market 
capitalization relative to GDP (in constant 2000 US$), gives an idea of the economic 
significance of the stock market.  The greater the ratio, the more significant is the stock 
marke ariables measure the liquidity of, or extent of 
e 
k’s World 
t to the economy.  The second two v
trading in, the stock market.  Stock market turnover measures the significance of the 
value traded relative to the value of the stock market and the value of shares traded 
relative to GDP (in constant 2000 US$), measures the significance of stock trading to th
overall economy.  Annual values of these data are available at the World Ban
Development Indicators (WDI) database online.105 
Hypothesis 2.  To classify a country’s legal system as a common law or civil law





he U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s 
                                                
10
They grouped countries into four legal categories: English common law, French civil 
German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law.  I code French, German and Scandina
civil law countries as belonging to the civil law family.  The variable Civil equals 1 for 
the latter countries and 0 for English common law countries.  For the countries that La 
Porta et al. did not report on, I fill in the gaps with t
 
tors, http://www.worldbank.org/ (follow “Data & Research” tab; 
et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ]; La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note [ ]. 
105 World Bank World Development Indica
then select “World Dev’t indicators” from the scroll down menu under “Key Statistics”) (last visited Jan. 
25, 2008).  
106 La Porta 
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(CIA) classifications of national legal systems that are available in its publication, the 
World Factbook.107  
Hypothesis 3a. For openness/competitiveness of the political process, I use three 
variables.  The first variable is the “fractionalization” of the legislature and comes from 
the Database of Political Institutions assembled by Professors Beck et al.108  This variab
measures the probability that two officers randomly chosen from the legislature are from
different political parties and ranges from 0 to 100%.  A higher value signifies suggests a 
more competitive legislature, i.e., that more political actors are “willing to act 
independently in the c
le 
 
onsideration of any given policy change.”109  Conversely, a lower 
value s
s.  It 
uggests a less competitive legislature.110  The second variable, also from the 
Database of Political Institutions, is a measure of political checks and balances.  It is the 
average of four alternative measures of political checks and balances and ranges between 
1 and 10.111  A higher value corresponds to more political checks and balances and a 
lower value corresponds to fewer political checks and balances.  The third variable, from 
the Polity IV Database,112 measures the general openness of political institution
                                                 
107 CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2008). 
Institutions [ ], 15 World Bank Econ. Rev. 165 (2001). 
109
108 Thorsten Beck et al., New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political 
 Id. at [ ]. 
110 Id. at [ ]. 
111 These measures, created by Professors Beck et al., take into consideration both the number of pivotal 
decision makers (i.e., those “whose agreement is necessary before policies can be changed”) and “the 
effectiveness of electoral checks on government decision makers.” Id. at [ ].  The measures “count the 
 
toral rules.” Id. at [ ]. 
, 2008) (containing a “coded annual information 
d authority characteristics for all independent states (with greater than 500,000 total 
n the global state system and covers the years 1800-2004”). 
number of veto players in a political system, adjusting for whether these veto players are independent of
each other, as determined by the level of electoral competitiveness in a system, their respective party 
affiliations, and the elec
112 Center for International Development and Conflict Management, Polity IV Database, 
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ranges between 0 and 10, with 10 indicating the greatest degree of openness and 0 the
least.   
Finally, using principal components analysis,
 
e 
tigate the political Hypothesis 3a. 
113 I combine the three political 
process variables into a single variable, called Democracy.  I use this combined variabl
to inves
Hypothesis 3b.  For political ideology, I again rely on the Database of Politica
Institutions.  The database includes information on the political orientation of the largest 
party in the government.  The dummy vari
l 





ial factors that may 
influence policy outcomes.  
First, I control for GDP per capita because wealthier countries tend to have 
nist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing, and 0 otherwise.  The dummy 
variable Center equals 1 if the largest party is centrist or its “position can best be 
described as centrist (e.g., party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a soc
liberal context),” and 0 otherwise.114  Finally, the dummy variable Right equals 1 if t
largest party is conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing. 
3. Control Variables 
In addition to the explanatory variables that I use to investigate the hypotheses, I
include several variables in the regressions to control for latent soc
stronger government institutions, rule of law traditions, and regulatory resources than 
poorer countries.115   
                                                 
113 Principal components analysis combines several correlated variables into a single common fact
more thorough explanation of the technique, see I. T. JOLLIFFE, PRINCIPAL
or.  For a 
 COMPONENT ANALYSIS (2002). 
114 A party is “[n]ot described as centrist if competing parties ‘average out’ to a centrist position (e.g., party 
of ‘right-wing Muslims and Beijing-oriented Marxists’).” Beck et al., supra note [ ], at [ ].   
115 See, e.g., Douglas North, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY [ ](1981); La Porta et al., 
Quality of Government, supra note [ ], at [ ]. 
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Second, I control for government quality.  Professors La Porta et al. demonstrate 
 
f corruption assembled by Professor Mauro.117  The index 
ranges 
 evidence suggests that Protestant countries have “better” 
govern
may increase demand for insider 
trading ance of 
n the 
ial 
                                                
that “good” governments protect property rights and promote the rule of law and thus 
facilitate orderly societies, markets, and economic prosperity.116  As a proxy for “good”
government, I use an index o
from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt).   
Third, I control for religious affiliation.  For reasons that are not entirely 
understood, empirical
ments than Catholic and Muslim countries.118  I create dummy variables for 
Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, and Other Religion to describe the dominant religion in 
each country.119    
Finally, anything that directs the public’s attention to the stock market and 
increases concern that it is run fairly and efficiently 
 legislation.  One such factor may be rapid growth in the economic signific
the stock market and the resulting growth of the investing class.  Rapid decline i
stock market may have a similar effect.  As they experience a decline in their financ
 
116 La Porta et al., Quality of Government, supra note [ ], at [ ]. 
117 Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681, [ ] (1995).  This control is justified by 
cross-country empirical studies showing that there is a significant negative correlation between corruption 
 manuscript, on file with author). 
ow that religion is a good instrument for 
rs is 
t [ ]. That is, xenophobia 
g 
a 
and the rule of law and financial openness.  See Zvika Neeman, M. Daniele Paserman, Avi Simhon, 
Corruption and Openness (2006) (unpublished
118 La Porta et al., Quality of Government, supra note [ ], at [ ] sh
the quality of institutions and government.  Landes claims the reason is that Catholicism and Islam are 
inherently (culturally) antithetical to institutional development.  DAVID LANDES, THE WEALTH AND 
POVERTY OF NATIONS [ ](1998).  However, La Porta et al. argue that the real reason why religion matte
not culture, but politics.  La Porta et al., Quality of Government, supra note [ ], a
and intolerance are used to fulfill the political, rather than the doctrinal/evangelical, aspirations of the rulin
class.  See generally Djankov et al., supra note [ ] (modeling a society’s choice of institutions that have 
bearing on the country’s economic performance). 
119 The dummy variable Protestant equals 1 if the dominant religion is Protestant, and 0 otherwise.  The 
dummy variable Catholic equals 1 if the dominant religion is Catholic, and 0 otherwise.  The dummy 
variable Muslim equals 1 if the dominant religion is Muslim, and 0 otherwise.  The dummy variable Other 
equals 1 if the dominant religion consists of religions besides Protestant, Catholic, and Muslims, and 0 
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wealth, investors may demand greater legal protection, especially if they attribute the 
decline to corporate fraud.120  In short, other things constant, investor demand for insider 
trading r 
each of the one hundred and three countries reported, Table 3 presents the year in which 
 legislation and enforcement may increase on the heels of dramatic growth o
decline of the stock market.  I control for this possibility using the five-year rate of 
growth in stock market capitalization relative to GDP.  I use the five-year growth rate 
because any policy response is likely to follow with a time lag.   
The data and their sources are described in Table 2. 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents the comparative experiences of stock markets until 1999.  For 
                                                 
120 See generally, STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND 











the public may well be aware that insider trading occurs with some frequency, but that perception d
generate opposition threatening either the market or the political status quo.  However, a few high profile 
insider trading scandals may spark public outrage that, at best, reduces public confidence in the stock 
market and, at worst, threatens the political status quo.  The government may respond by enacting securitie
market reforms, including banning insider trading or ramping up the enforcement of existing laws, in o
to restore public confidence in the stock market or to avoid political backlash that could create even more 
inefficiencies than insider trading may create.  See Mark Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217, [ ] (1998).  
This phenomenon occurred in the United States in the 1930s after the stock market crash, which 
precipitated the creation of federal securities regulations and an enforcement agency (the SEC).  Similarly, 
in the 1980s, during a period of hostile takeovers and highly publicized insider trading scandals (l
Milken and Boesky cases), the U.S. Congress and the SEC responded to the perceived excesses with 
heightened insider trading sanctions and enforcement.  E.g., The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, §§ 3-5, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.
§§ 78u-1, 78ff(a), 78t-1 (2000)).  More recently in the U.S., Enron, Tyco International, WorldCom and
other high profile corporate and accounting scandals have been responsible for the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act.  Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U
(2000 & Supp. III 2004)).  See also Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Polit
Economy Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95 (2004) (arguing that most U.S. corporate crime legislation is 
enacted in periods when there is great public outcry over corporate scandals and economic downturn); 
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE
J. 1521 (2005). (a critique of the political process leading to SOX following “a free-falling market and 
media frenzy over corporate scandals shortly before midterm congressional elections”); Bebchuk & 
Neeman, supra note [ ], at 29 (predicting that investor protection will increase after “scandals or crashes 
that make problems of insider opportunism more salient” and citing the 1933 and 1934 U.S. securitie
and Sarbanes Oxley as consistent evidence).  While it would be ideal to investigate the effect of scandals 
directly, the data do not allow such a test.  Controlling for stock market growth may indirectly address the 
role of scandals to the extent that they become more salient in periods when such growth is dramatic. 
 38
38
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 81 [2008]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art81
the country’s main stock exchange was established, the year (if any) in which the 
country’s insider trading legislation was enacted, and the year (if any) in which such
legislation was initially enforced.   
Table 3 illustrates the wide range of experiences across co
 
untries.  For example, 
the  1585.  The youngest stock 
khstan in 1997.  The earliest insider trading legislation 
ecades 
ir insider trading laws until 1998 and 1999, 
respect  
.   
99, the 
a, 
                                                
oldest stock exchange was established in Germany in
exchange was established in Kaza
was passed in 1934 in the United States.  Some countries, like Bulgaria, Swaziland and 
Kuwait had not yet regulated insider trading as of 1999.  The United States was also the 
first country to enforce its insider trading laws while it took some countries three d
longer to enforce (and sometimes to enact) insider trading legislation.  For example, 
Spain and Oman did not enforce the
ively.  The non-enforcing group as of 1999 included both developed markets such
as Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg, and New Zealand and emerging markets such as 
Mexico, Russia.  Note that the average years of enactment and initial enforcement of 
insider trading legislation are roughly similar between developed and emerging stock 
markets.  This means that emerging stock markets tend to enact and enforce insider 
trading laws when their stock markets are relatively younger, and suggests that it is not a 
history of experience with stock trading per se that leads to insider trading legislation
While Table 3 presents data for all countries with a stock market as of 19
descriptive statistics are calculated using fewer countries.  To start with, they exclude the 
nine countries that enacted insider trading legislation before 1980121 and Yugoslavi
 
121 Brazil, Canada, France, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, and the United States 
lysis, 
enacted insider trading legislation before 1980.  The United Kingdom is excluded from the duration 
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leaving a total of ninety-three countries.  Ideally, this would translate into 1860 country
year observations per variable, i.e., one observation for each of the ninety-three coun
in each of the twenty years from 1980 to 1999.  However, consistently measured data for 







riable categories (most are significant at the 1% 
level). 
r 
enforced insider trading legislation earlier, respectively, than poorer countries and 
-observations.122  Countries are also automatically dropped (or censored) from the
duration analysis for all the years after the year in which they enacted (or enforced) 
insider trading legislation.  Accordingly, I note the number of observations underlying
duration regressions presented below. 
Table 4 presents summary statistics of the main variables.  Table 5 reports 
average correlations between the year in which insider trading legislation was enacted or 
first enforced and the explanatory variables and is thus more interesting from the 
perspective of the hypotheses.  A negative coefficient suggests that an explanatory 
variable is associated with earlier enactment or enforcement insider trading legislatio
and vice versa.  The most striking feature of Table 5 is the high proportion of statistically 
significant correlations spanning all va
 The timing of insider trading legislation and enforcement seem to be 
systematically and statistically significantly related to the explanatory variables rather 
than a mere coincidence.  
The following relationships are statistically significant in Table 5.  Wealthie
countries and countries with more developed stock markets tend to have enacted and 
                                                                                                                                                 
though it is included in calculation of the descriptive statistics presented in this section.  Countries are also 
dropped from the duration analysis for all the years after the year in which they enacted (or enforced) [  ? ].  
122 This problem is not unique to this study.  See, e.g., GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note [ ], at 24-25 
(discussing “the small-n problem that bedevils [them] throughout [their] book”). 
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countries with less developed stock markets.  Common law countries tend to have passed 
insider trading legislation earlier than civil law countries.  Countries with more open 
political systems and countries with left-leaning governments generally passe
enforced insider trading laws earlier, respectively, than countries with less open politica
systems and countries with
d and 
l 








the entire period.   
The results are presented in Table 6.  The first four columns (1-4) show the 
individual factors – finance, law and politics – that correspond, respectively, to 
of finance.123  Less corrupt countries tend to have enacted and enforced such la
sooner than more corrupt countries.  Finally, predominantly Protestant countries tend 
have enforced (not enacted) insider trading laws sooner than predominantly Catholi
Muslim countries.124  Aside from the finding that civil law countries on average enforced 
insider trading legislation earlier than common law countries, the results in Table 5 ar
largely consistent with the hypotheses presented in Part III.  
C. Results of Duration Analysis 
In this section, I investigate the hypotheses using duration analysis, as explained
in Part IV. 
1. Enactment of Insider Trading Legislation 
The measured duration (i.e., the time at “risk” of enacting legislation) for each 
country is the period between 1980 and the year in which the country enacted insider 
trading legislation.  If a country had not enacted insider trading legislation between 1980
and 1999, it is considered to have been at “risk” for enactment during 
                                                 
123 Roe, Legal Origins, supra note [ ]. 
124 Table 5 also suggests that countries that enact insider trading legislation earlier tend to enforce them 
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Hypotheses 1-3.  Column 5 shows the full model with the control variables.  Contrary to 
suggesting that more developed stock markets took longer to enact insider 










                                                                                                                                                
Hypothesis 1, in column 1 the coefficient on stock market capitalization relative to GDP 
is positive, 
 legislation.  However, the coefficient is insignificant. 
ient on civil law legal origin is positive.  This suggests that, as Hypothesis 2 
predicts, civil law countries are were less apt than common law countries to enact insi
trading legislation between 1980 and 1999.  Again, however, the coefficient is 
insignificant.  In column 3, the coefficient on the democracy index is negative and 
ant at the 10% level.  Consistent with Hypothesis 3a, this means that strong 
democracies were more likely to enact insider trading during the period than wea
democracies.  In column 4, the ideology variables are insignificant, although the 
coefficient on the right government dummy variable is negative, consistent with 
Hypothesis 3b.  In the full model, reported in column 5, the coefficient on the democra
index remains negative and is significant at the 5% level.   
In summary, the results in Table 6 suggest that political openness was the 
dominant factor in countries’ adoption of insider trading legislation between 1980 and 
1999.  This finding is consistent with the prediction that outsiders have a comparative 
advantage over corporate insiders in strong democracies with open political institut
Numerically, the regression in column 5 suggests that if a country had experienced a
unit increase in its composite democracy index it would have experienced a 36% pe
decrease in its expected time to enact insider trading legislation between 1980 and
other things constant.   
 
positive correlation would be expected even if the time from enactment to the first enforcement were a 
random process.  
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2. Enforcement of Insider Trading Legislation 
As explained above, I measure the duration until initial enforcement of insider 
trading e at 
t 
with Hypothesis 1 and suggests that countries with more 
significant stock m ding legislation between 




cies were more likely to enforce insider trading 
laws du  
999 
 legislation in two ways.  Under the first approach, the duration (i.e., the tim
“risk”) for each country is the time between 1980 and the year in which the country firs
enforced its insider trading legislation.  If a country had not enforced insider trading 
legislation between 1980 and 1999, it is considered to have been at “risk” for 
enforcement during the entire period.  
Table 7 presents the results for the first approach in Panel A.  In column 1, the 
coefficient on stock market capitalization is negative and significant at the 5% level.  
This result is consistent 
arkets were more likely to enforce insider tra
d 1999 than countries with less significant stock markets.  As for legal family, i
column 2, the coefficient on civil law origin is negative, which is inconsistent with the 
legal family theory because it implies that civil law countries were more prone to enforce
insider trading legislation than common law countries between 1980 and 1999. Howe
the coefficient on civil law is insignificant in column 2.  Consistent with Hypo
column 3 suggests that strong democra
ring the period than weak democracies.  The coefficient on the democracy index
is negative and significant at the 1% level.  Column 4 shows that right-leaning 
governments were more prone to enforce insider trading laws between 1980 and 1
than left-leaning governments, consistent with Hypothesis 3b, but this result is only 
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The full model is shown in column 5.  There, the coefficient on the democracy 
index remains negative and significant at the 5% level.  More specifically, the regression 
in column 5 suggests that a country that had increased its democracy score by one point 
would have experienced a 17% reduction of its expected time to enforce insider trading
legislation during the period, other things constant.  In addition, the coefficient on the 
right government dummy variable remains negative and becomes significant at 
level.  This result implies that, other things constant, a country whose government had 
moved from left to right would have experienced a 22% decrease in its expected time to 
enforce insider trading legislation between
 
the 1% 
 1980 and 1999.  These results support the 
political theory of finance.125  Counterintuitively to the legal family school of thought, 
the regression in column 5 suggests that civil law countries had a 25% lower expected 
time to enforce insider trading legislation than common law countries during the period, 
other things constant.  Also, while financial development appears to have been 
independently significant (see column 1), it is not robust like the political factors.  
Finally, column 5 shows that wealthy countries, as measured by per capita GDP, were 
more likely than poor countries to enforce insider trading legislation between 1980 and 
1999.  This result not surprising because enforcement involves a significant expenditure 
of resources.126 
Under the second approach, the duration (i.e., the time at “risk”) for each country 
is the time between the year in which the country enacted insider trading legislation and 
the year in which the country first enforced such legislation.  If a country had enacted but 
not enforced insider trading legislation between 1980 and 1999 it is considered to have 
                                                 
125 See, e.g., Roe, Legal Origins, supra note [ ]. 
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been at “risk” for enforcement over the entire period between the year when the country 
enacted the law and 1999. 
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 7.  In column 1, the coefficient on 
stock m
ernment variable is negative as predicted, the coefficients on 
both id
ng 
arket capitalization is negative, as expected, but it is only marginally significant.  
Column 2 shows that legal origin is insignificant.  In column 3, the coefficient on the 
democracy index is negative and significant at the 5% level.  Consistent with Hypothesis 
3a, this result suggests that strong democracies tended to enforce their insider trading 
laws sooner after enacting such laws than weak democracies.  In column 4, although the 
coefficient on the right gov
eology variables are insignificant.   
Finally, column 5 reports the full model for the second measure of enforcement.  
The coefficient on the democracy index remains negative but becomes insignificant, 
while the coefficient on right ideology remains negative and becomes significant at the 
5% level.  Thus, the results in column 5 confirm the finding in Panel A that right-leani
governments tend to have been more inclined to enforce insider trading legislation than 
left-leaning governments between 1980 and 1999. The coefficient on civil law origin 
remains negative and insignificant.   
  In summary, the enforcement results reinforce the preeminence of political 
explanations over financial and legal explanations of insider trading regulation.127  
                                                                                                                                                 
126 See generally Jackson & Roe, supra note [ ], at [ ] (parenthetical strongly encouraged).  However, the 
ally produce a better fit of the data than the enactment 
regressions. 
coefficient is relatively small. 
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D. Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of the results, I do several things.  First, the analyses 
above i
nsider 






control variables.  The results are similar to those of the Weibull regressions.   
nclude members of the European Community (EC).  These countries were 
required, pursuant to the EC Insider Trading Directive of 1989, to enact minimum i
trading legislation by June 1, 19
ent regressions is that they include European countries with strong democracie
that did not necessarily choose to but were required to enact insider trading legislat
However, I run the enactment regressions without the EC members and the results are 
unchanged.  In fact, when I exclude the EC members, the political explanations of 
enactment (i.e., democracy and ideology) appear even more influential.129  Second, I run
the same regressions using the liquidity measures of stock development (stock market 
turnover and value traded relative to GDP) in place of stock market capitalization relati
to GDP.  This does not change the results either.  Third, I run the same sets of regre
excluding countries whose stock markets were established after 1975, 1980 and 1990, 
respectively, in case a different dynamic affected these relatively young stock markets 
during the period in question.  This does not change the results.  I run country random 
effects logit regressions for each of the duration measures on all of the explanatory and 
                                                 
128 89/592/EEC of November 13, 1989.  See generally, E I D , supra note [ ] 
(parenthetical encouraged); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Insider Trading Regulation, 15 
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 63 (2002) (discussing the EC Directive and differences in substantive provisions of 
insider trading laws across countries); Amy E. Stutz, A New Look at the European Economic Community 
Directive on Insider Trading, 23 Vand. J. Trasnat’l L. 135 (1990) (describing, in Parts III and IV, the EC 
Directive and various EC members’ insider trading laws). 
EC members were not required to enforce such legislation,
UROPEAN NSIDER EALING
efficient on the democracy index is -1.13 and significant at 1% 
and the coefficient on right government is -0.79 and significant at 1%.  Compare these results with the 
corresponding results in column 5 of Table 6. 
 however, so their inclusion in the enforcement 
regressions should not affect those results. 
129 When I exclude the EC members, the co
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VI. Conclusion 
The article began with a stylized political economy model of insider trading tha
encompasses both private and public interest theories of regulation.  However, because
the underlying dynamics of this model are unobservable across countries, I then shifted 




about the comparative timing of ement of insider trading regulation 
across 
f 




 enactment and enforc
countries. 
   The results are most consistent with Roe’s labor-versus-capital political theory o
finance and suggest that politics is the first-order determinant of comparative insider 
trading policies.  In particular, the results suggest that political openness and ideology 
most aptly explain the comparative timing of insider trading regulation and enforcement 
across countries.  
en d insider trading laws earlier than less democratic or authoritarian political 
systems, controlling for wealth, financial development, legal origin, and measures of 
latent social factors.  The results also show that left-leaning governments were relative 
latecomers to insider trading legislation and enforcement relative to right-leaning and 
centrist governments, controlling for the same factors as above.  In contrast to the 
political theory of finance, the legal family theory of finance does not explain the 
differential timing of insider trading regulation and enforcement across countries.  In f
the results suggest that civil law countries may sometimes be more inclined than common 
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This article’s findings have important implications for the longstanding debate 
about insider trading regulation.  While the private interest theory of insider trading 
regulation posits that insider trading regulation is inefficient, this view is increasingly 
challenged by the accumulating international evidence on the beneficial effects of insider 
trading regulation by the state.  The latter evidence suggests that stock markets become 
more in g 
ore 
 laws, 
                                                
formationally efficient and liquid and the cost of capital falls after insider tradin
laws have been enacted and/or enforced.  The evidence presented in this paper 
strengthens that challenge because it suggests that the kinds of governments that are m
prone to regulate insider trading are precisely the governments that are generally believed 
to pursue market-promoting, not market-inhibiting, policies.130  Market-oriented 
democracies are more likely to have a polity willing and able to overcome entrenched 
insider opposition to capital market development than authoritarian states.131  
The foregoing result, however, does not prove that right- and center-leaning 
democracies adopt more efficient insider trading laws than left-leaning autocracies.  This 
article does not address cross-country variation in the substantive content of these
 
130 See Donald Whittman, Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1395 (1989).  See 
also Mancur Olson, The New Institutional Economics: The Collective Choice Approach to Economic 
Development, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: GROWTH AND GOVERNANCE IN LESS-






DEVELOPED AND POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 
time horizons have an incentive to confiscate their subjects’ assets and “[a]ny autocracy must sooner or 
later have a short time horizon”); Kevin Grier & Michael Munger, On Democracy, Regime Duration, a
Economic Growth (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (2006) (showing empirically that ove
long-term non-autocracies produce greater economic growth than autocracies).  See also Djankov et al., 
supra note [ ], at 612-612 (“voting is often a powerful force toward more efficient institutions”); 
Acemoglu, supra note [ ] (suggesting that stronger democracies are more apt to produce efficient, or at leas
less inefficient, policies than authoritarian states).  But see Robert Barro, Democracy and Growth, 1 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (1996) (finding a non-linear relationship between democracy and 
growth in which greater political freedom initially enhances growth but dampens growth once a m
level of political freedom has been attained).   
131 While the article has not addressed the role of foreign investment and membership in multilateral 
organizations in influencing a country’s insider trading policies, my hunch is that they are secondary t
domestic politics.  At any rate, moreover, they are strongly correlated with countries’ internal political 
conditions.   
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but merely examines the determinants of the relative timing of a country’s switch from







 more complete picture would emerge if it were possible to estimate the 
relationship between financial development, legal origin and politics, respectively, and 
the stringency of the substantive rules over time.132  Such an analysis could reveal a mor
complex (i.e., non-linear) relationship between the explanatory variables and insider 
trading policy.  It may reveal, for example, that the stringency of a country’s insider 
trading law increases in its level of democracy.  If overly restrictive insider tradin
are inefficient, such a finding would suggest that stronger democracies tend to adopt 
inefficient insider trading policies.133   Alternatively, it may reveal that stronger 
democracies adopt moderately stringent laws rather than excessively restrictive laws o
no laws at all.134   
                                                 
1931.  Specifically, in addition to examining the relationship between several explanatory variables an
stringency of these laws.  He finds that while ideology heavily influences the adoption of securiti
the first instance, private interests (in parti lar, small banks that competed with securities firms)
132 Mahoney, supra note [ ], conducts such an analysis of state securities laws in the U.S. between 1911 and 
d the 
mere adoption of securities laws, he also examines the relationship between these variables and the 
es laws in 
cu  had a 
stronger influence than ideology on the type of law that was adopted.  Elsewhere, I examine the relationship 
between the substantive content of countries’ insider trading laws and financial development, though in a 
 
emoglu, supra note [ ], at [ ].  See also Whittman, supra note [ ], at 1397-1418 (arguing that 
he best 
ith 
because it strengthens their claim for selling good 
a 
 
t of regulation”).  I am inclined to think that democracies 
static context.  Beny, Do Laws Matter?, supra note [ ].   
133 Acemoglu, however, suggests that countries in which the ruling elite are subject to greater checks and
balances, i.e., stronger democracies, are less likely to adopt inefficient policies than more authoritarian 
countries.  Ac
democracies produce more efficient policy outcomes than non-democracies and giving example of zoning 
rules in the U.S.); Djankov et al., supra note [ ], at 612-613 (“voting is often a power force toward more 
efficient institutions” and “[t]he substantial rise in the world’s prosperity in the 20th century may be t
evidence of the virtues of democratic politics”). 
134 Richard Epstein suggests that “the light touch version [i.e., moderate insider trading laws] is in line w
voluntary arrangements and thus imposes relatively little costs on firms and gives them this advantage. The 
firm decision [to privately prohibit insider trading] is bonded and backed by the government. It is like the 
food companies that love federal inspection within limits 
food. But once the laws become too strong, then they no longer replicate what the firms want and become 
drag.” Conversation between the author and Professor Epstein.  For one example of “light touch” 
regulation, see Adam C. Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Securities Markets, REG. 32 (2003) (arguing 
that the government’s regulatory role ought to be limited “to ensuring that exchanges actually enforce their
[insider trading and anti-manipulation] rules as written and aiding in the enforcement of those rules” 
because exchanges have better incentives than the government “to regulate in a way that optimizes the 
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There is, in other words, a genuine question of whether securities regulation take
the form of a Laffe
s 




able, from which it would then be possible to estimate the magnitude of the error 
in both directions.135  Unfortunately, the existing data do not permit such a refined 
analysis.136  Until they do, the evidence presented in this paper is, perhaps, the best 
knowledge we have to date about the broad factors that are related to the timing of a
country’s initial adoption and enforcement of insider trading laws. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
are more apt to adopt efficient insider trading policies than autocracies, for the reasons noted above.  See 
infra note 133. 
135 This assumes, perhaps unrealistically, that we can determine the optimal degree insider trading and, 
more generally, securities regulation for any given country at any given point in time.  
136 While not impossible, such an analysis would require information on the substantive content of the 
insider trading laws of over one hundred countries.  The analysis, because it is dynamic, would also require 
information on changes in the substantive content of each country's laws over twenty years.  In turn, that 
would raise translation and access problems, not to mention the difficulty of devising the proper coding 
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Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis Summary 
Hypothesis1 A country with a more developed stock market is more likely to enact and enforce insider trading 
legislation than a country with a less developed stock market. 
 
Hypothesis 2 A common law country is more apt to enact and enforce insider trading legislation than a civil law 
country with the same level of stock market development. 
 
Hypothesis 3a A country with a more democratic political system is more likely to enact and enforce insider 
trading legislation than a country with a less democratic political system with the same level of 
stock market development. 
 
Hypothesis 3b A country with a left-leaning government is more likely to enact and enforce insider trading 
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Table 2: Description of Variables and Sources 
 
 
Variable Description and Source 
Year main stock 
exchange was 
established  
The year in which the country’s main stock exchange was established.   
 
Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note [ ], at [ ]. 
 
Year insider trading 
law was enacted 
 
The year in which the country passed insider trading legislation.   
 
Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note [ ], at [ ]. 
 
Year insider trading 
law was initially 
enforced 
The year in which the country initially enforced its insider trading legislation. 
 
Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note [ ], at [ ]. 
 
Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per 
capita 
Annual per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in constant US$ (2000) for the years 1980-1997.   
 
World Bank World Development Indicators, supra note [ ]; United Nations Statistics, 




relative to GDP  
Annual stock market capitalization (number of outstanding shares multiplied by their market value) 
divided by GDP in constant US$ (2000) for the years 1980-1999. 
 
World Bank World Development Indicators, supra note [ ]. 
 
Total value of 
stocks traded 
relative to GDP 
Annual total value traded divided by stock market capitalization in constant US$ (2000) for the years 
1980-1997.   
 
World Bank World Development Indicators, supra note [ ]. 
Stock market 
turnover 
Annual total value of shares traded on the stock exchange divided by GDP for the years 1980-1997.   
 
World Bank World Development Indicators, supra note [ ]. 
 
Legal family A dummy variable that signifies the country’s legal origin.  The variable equals 1 if the country has a 
civil law system and 0 if the country has a common law system.   
 




This variable measures the general openness of political institutions, measured annually over 1980-1999.  
The variable ranges between 0 and 10, with 10 signifying the highest degree of political openness and 0 
signifying the lowest degree of political openness.  The 11-point scale is constructed additively.   
 




This variable measures the annual probability that two officers chosen at random from the legislature are 
members of different parties.  The index ranges between 0% and 100% and is assigned a missing value if 
the country has no parliament.  The variable was reported for the years 1980-1995.   
 





This variable equals the average value of four measures of political checks and balances, measured 
annually over 1980-1995.  The measures incorporate both the number of decision-makers “whose 
agreement is necessary before policies can be changed” and “the effectiveness of electoral checks on 
government decision makers.”  The variable ranges between 1 and 10, with 10 signifying the most checks 
and balances and 0 signifying the least checks and balances.  
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Democracy index Composite of preceding three political process variables, calculated using principal components analysis. 
 
Ideology of the 
largest government 
party 
Dummy variables for the ideology of the largest party in the government.  The dummy variable Left 
equals 1 if the largest party is communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing, and 0 otherwise.  The 
dummy variable Center equals 1 if the largest party is centrist or its “position can best be described as 
centrist (e.g., party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context),” and 0 
otherwise.  A party is “[n]ot described as centrist if competing parties ‘average out’ to a centrist position 
(e.g., party of ‘right-wing Muslims and Beijing-oriented Marxists’).”  The dummy variable Right equals 
1 if the largest party is conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing.  Ideology was reported for the 
years 1980-1995.  
 
Beck et al., supra note [ ]. 
 
Corruption score “The degree to which business transactions involve corruption or questionable payments.”  The index 
ranges between 0 and 10.  0 signifies the highest degree of corruption or side payments in business 
dealings, while 10 indicates the lowest degree of corruption or side payments in business transactions.  
The corruption index for a given country is the average value over the years 1980-1983.   
 
Mauro, supra note [ ]. 
 
Religious affiliation Dummy variables for the dominant religious affiliation of the country’s population.  The dummy variable 
Protestant equals 1 if the dominant religion is Protestant, and 0 otherwise.  The dummy variable Catholic 
equals 1 if the dominant religion is Catholic, and 0 otherwise.  The dummy variable Muslim equals 1 if 
the dominant religion is Muslim, and 0 otherwise.  The dummy variable Other equals 1 if the dominant 
religion consists of religions besides Protestant, Catholic, and Muslims, and 0 otherwise.   
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Table 3: Comparative Experiences 
The data in this table come from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). 
 
Country Year of Establishment of 
Main Stock Exchange 
Year Insider Trading Law 
Enacted 
Year of First Enforcement 
of Insider Trading Law 
 
Developed Stock Markets 
 
Australia 1859 1991 1996 
Austria 1771 1993 None 
Belgium 1801 1990 1994 
Canada 1878 1966 1976 
Denmark 1919 1991 1996 
Finland 1912 1989 1993 
France  1826 1967 1975 
Germany 1585 1994 1995 
Hong Kong 1891 1991 1994 
Ireland 1793 1990 None 
Italy 1806 1991 1996 
Japan 1878 1988 1990 
Luxembourg 1929 1991 None 
Netherlands 1600s 1989 1994 
New Zealand 1870 1988 No 
Norway 1819 1985 1990 
Singapore 1930 1973 1978 
Spain 1831 1994 1998 
Sweden 1863 1971 1990 
Switzerland 1938 1988 1995 
United Kingdom 1773 1980 1981 
United States 1792 1934 1961 
Developed Average 1828 1990 1994 
 
Emerging Stock Markets 
 
Argentina 1854 1991 1995 
Armenia 1993 1993 None 
Bahrain 1987 1990 None 
Bangladesh 1954 1995 1998 
Barbados 1987 1987 None 
Bermuda 1971 None None 
Bolivia 1979 None None 
Botswana 1989 None None 
Brazil 1890 1976 1978 
Bulgaria 1991 None None 
Chile 1893 1981 1996 
China 1990 1993 None 
Colombia 1928 1990 None 
58 
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Costa Rica 1976 1990 None 
Croatia 1918 1995 None 
Cyprus 1996 1999 None 
Czech Republic  1871 1992 1993 
Ecuador 1969 1993 None 
Egypt 1890 1992 None 
El Salvador 1992 None None 
Estonia 1996 1996 None 
Ghana 1989 1993 None 
Greece 1876 1988 1996 
Guatemala 1986 1996 None 
Honduras 1992 1988 None 
Hungary 1864 1994 1995 
Iceland 1985 1989 None 
India 1875 1992 1998 
Indonesia   1912 1991 1996 
Iran  1966 None None 
Israel 1953 1981 1989 
Jamaica  1961 1993 None 
Jordan  1978 None None 
Kazakhstan  1997 1996 None 
Kenya  1954 1989 None 
Kuwait  1984 None None 
Latvia  1993 None None 
Lebanon  1920 1995 None 
Lithuania  1926 1996 None 
Macedonia  1996 1997 None 
Malawi  1996 None None 
Malaysia  1973 1973 1996 
Malta  1992 1990 None 
Mauritius  1988 1988 None 
Mexico  1894 1975 None 
Moldova  1994 1995 None 
Mongolia  1991 1994 None 
Morocco  1929 1993 None 
Namibia  1992 None None 
Nigeria  1960 1979 None 
Oman  1988 1989 1999 
Pakistan  1947 1995 None 
Palestine  1995 None None 
Panama  1990 1996 None 
Paraguay  1977 1999 None 
Peru  1951 1991 1994 
Philippines 1927 1982 None 
Poland  1817 1991 1993 
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Romania 1882 1995 None 
Russia  1994 1996 None 
Saudi Arabia  1984 1990 None 
Slovakia  1991 1992 None 
Slovenia  1924 1994 1998 
South Africa  1887 1989 None 
South Korea  1956 1976 1988 
Sri Lanka  1896 1987 1996 
Swaziland  1990 None None 
Taiwan  1961 1988 1989 
Tanzania  1998 1994 None 
Thailand  1974 1984 1993 
Trinidad  1981 1981 None 
Tunisia  1969 1994 None 
Turkey  1866 1981 1996 
Ukraine 1992 None None 
Uruguay  1867 1996 None 
Uzbekistan  1994 None None 
Venezuela  1840 1998 None 
Yugoslavia  1894 1997 None 
Zambia  1994 1993 None 
Zimbabwe  1896 None None 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics 
The variables are described in Table 2 
 























Year Law First Enforced 27 countries 1994 2.7 
years 
1989 1999 
Gross Domestic Product 











Stock market capitalization 











Stock market turnover 1037 0.4 0.5 <.01 5.3 
Total value of stocks traded 



































Political openness score 1167 6.3 4.0 0 10 
Corruption score 900 6.9 2.4 1.5 10 
Civil Law All countries 71%    
Left  798 40%    
Center 798 10%    
Right 798 50%    
Protestant  1840 10%    
Catholic 1840 30%    
Muslim 1840 20%    
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Table 5: Correlations 
The variables are described in Table 2.  The numbers in parentheses are 
the probability levels (p-values) at which the null hypothesis of zero 
correlation can be rejected in two-tailed tests.  The Superscripts a, b, c 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Variable Year Law Enacted Year Enforced 
Year Law Enacted 1.00  
Year Law First Enforced 0.536a 
(0.000) 
1.00 
Gross Domestic Product 





Stock market capitalization 





Total value of stocks traded 
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Table 6 
Weibull Regressions of Expected Time to Enactment of Insider Trading Legislation 
The regression is a Weibull hazard model, ebxT += ')ln(  where the dependent variable ln(T) is the log 
of the expected time to enactment of insider trading legislation between 1980 and 1999.  Each explanatory 
variable, described in Table 2, is measured in each year during the period that a country is at “risk,” except 
the years for which the variable is missing.  For Hypothesis 2, the omitted dummy variable is common law.  
Thus, the coefficient on the civil law dummy variable measures the effect of having a civil law system on 
the probability of enacting insider trading legislation relative to the effect of having a common law system.  
For Hypothesis 3, the omitted dummy variable is left government.  Thus, the coefficients on the right and 
center dummy variables measure the effect of having a right or center government on the probability of 
enacting insider trading legislation relative to the effect of having a left government.  The regression 
constant is not reported.  The superscripts a and b, respectively, denote the 1% and 5% significance levels.  
See Figure 2 for a graph of the cumulative hazard function.  
 















GDP per capita     6.20x10-6 
(0.00) 
Market Capitalization/GDP 0.02 
(0.14) 
   -0.21 
(0.24) 




  0.10 
(0.31) 






Center-dominated government   
 




Right-dominated government  
 




Corruption index  
 








   0.38 
(0.35) 
Other religion  
 
   -0.51b 
(0.24) 
5-year growth of market capitalization/GDP  
 
   0.01 
(0.03) 
Number of countries 72 
 
92 63 56 23 
No. observations 538 1160 556 458 172 
LR 0.02 1.65 3.95 0.77 11.49 
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Table 7: Panel A 
Weibull Regressions of Expected Time to Enforcement of Insider Trading Legislation 
The regression is a Weibull hazard model, ebxT += ')ln(  where the dependent variable ln(T) is the log 
of the expected time to initial enforcement of insider trading legislation between 1980 and 1999.  Each 
explanatory variable, described in Table 2, is measured in each year during the period that a country is at 
“risk,” except the years for which the variable is missing.  For Hypothesis 2, the omitted dummy variable is 
common law.  Thus, the coefficient on the civil law dummy variable measures the effect of having a civil 
law system on the probability of initially enforcing insider trading legislation relative to the effect of having 
a common law system.  For Hypothesis 3, the omitted dummy variable is left government.  Thus, the 
coefficients on the right and center dummy variables measure the effect of having a right or center 
government on the probability of initially enforcing insider trading legislation relative to the effect of 
having a left government.  The regression constant is not reported.  The superscripts a, b, and c, 
respectively, denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels.  See Figure 3 for a graph of the cumulative 
hazard function.  
 















GDP per capita     6.20x10-6 c 
(5.38x10-6) 
Market Capitalization/GDP -0.16b 
(0.08) 
   -0.11 
(0.09) 




  -0.25b 
(0.12) 






Center-dominated government   
 




Right-dominated government  
 




Corruption index  
 








   1.83 
(577.74) 
Other religion  
 
   -0.28b 
(0.12) 
5-year growth of market capitalization/GDP  
 
   -0.01 
(0.00) 
Number of countries 91 
 
93 70 61 29 
No. observations 981 1647 817 703 307 
LR 3.21 0.29 10.97 3.88 28.74 
P-value of Chi2 0.07 0.59 0.00 0.14 0.00 
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Table 7: Panel B 
Weibull Regressions of Expected Time to Enforcement of Insider Trading Legislation 
The regression is a Weibull hazard model, ebxT += ')ln(  where the dependent variable ln(T) is the log 
of the expected time to initial enforcement of insider trading legislation between the year of enactment and 
1999.  Each explanatory variable, described in Table 2, is measured in each year during the period that a 
country is at “risk,” except the years for which the variable is missing.  For Hypothesis 2, the omitted 
dummy variable is common law.  Thus, the coefficient on the civil law dummy variable measures the effect 
of having a civil law system on the probability of initially enforcing insider trading legislation relative to 
the effect of having a common law system.  For Hypothesis 3, the omitted dummy variable is left 
government.  Thus, the coefficients on the right and center dummy variables measure the effect of having a 
right or center government on the probability of initially enforcing insider trading legislation relative to the 
effect of having a left government.  The regression constant is not reported.  The superscripts a, b, and c, 
respectively, denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels.  See Figure 4 for a graph of the cumulative 
hazard function.  
 















GDP per capita     -0.00a 
(0.00) 
Market Capitalization/GDP -0.43 
(0.29) 
   -0.07 
(0.31) 




  -0.54 
(0.41) 






Center-dominated government   
 




Right-dominated government  
 




Corruption index  
 








   6.30 
(1317) 
Other religion  
 
   -0.37 
(0.43) 
5-year growth of market capitalization/GDP  
 
   -0.02 
(0.04) 
Number of countries 74 
 
75 56 51 28 
No. observations 443 487 261 245 135 
LR 2.22 2.62 7.23 2.88 24.92 
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Appendix: A Model of Competition over Insider Trading Policy 
 
 
This model of the market for insider trading regulation is based on Becker’s (1983) classic model of 
interest group competition.  As in Becker’s model, the model presented here incorporates both private 
(distributional) and public (efficiency) considerations.  There are three parties: “insiders”, “outsiders” and 
the regulator.  “Insiders” and “outsiders” compete for political influence over the regulator, who determines 
the legal status of insider trading and the sanctions for violating the law, as well as enforcement policy.  
The ensuing competition generates an equilibrium outcome in the “market” for insider trading regulation.   
 
1) The Market for Insider Trading Regulation 
 
a) The Demand for Insider Trading Legislation 
 
Any given insider trading regime tends to favor one party over the other.  “Insiders” favor a lax 
insider trading policy, while “outsiders” favor a strict insider trading policy.  If the law is strengthened, 
wealth is transferred from “insiders” to “outsiders”, and vice versa.  Each group’s expenditures on political 
influence (lobbying, information campaigns, monetary bribes, etc.) are a function of the amount of wealth 
transferred to the group via the regulatory policy.  Positive transfers generate support and negative transfers 
generate opposition.  At the political equilibrium, each group maximizes its income by spending an optimal 
amount on political pressure, given the behavior of the competing group and the productivity of its own 
expenditures. 
The insider trading policy, denoted α, ranges from the most lax policy (i.e., minimal restrictions 
and sanctions, and lax enforcement) to the strictest policy (i.e., maximal restrictions and sanctions, and 
vigorous enforcement).  The policy generates a level of “insider” and “outsider” rents, πI(α) and πO(α), 
respectively, with the properties πI’(α) < 0, πI’’(α) > 0; πO’(α) > 0, πO’’(α) < 0; and  
πI’(α) = - πO’(α).  The policy, α, transfers the amount Ti to each group: 
 
)()0()( αα OOOT Π−Π=
 
 ,)()0()( αα IIIT Π−Π=
 
where ∏i(0) is the total rent of group i when insider trading is not regulated, and ∏i(α) is the total rent of 
group i under the insider trading policy α.  Each group’s political support Si(α) is a function of the group’s 
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where ri = niei, ni  equals the number of members in group i, ei equals the expenditures per member of group 
i, and ni and ei are, for the time being, fixed.   
 
 
b) The Supply of Insider Trading Legislation and Regulatory Equilibrium 
 
 The regulator chooses the policy, α*, that maximizes its total political support.  That is, the 
regulator solves the following maximization problem:  
 
 )](S  )([SMax OI ααα +  
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This first order condition implies that, at the regulatory equilibrium, the regulator maximizes its total 
political support by implementing the policy, α*, that equates “insiders’” marginal opposition and 







2) Comparative Statics 
 
a) The Effect of a Change in the Size of a Constituency 
 
A change in the size of one the competing constituencies changes the productivity of its 
expenditures on political influence.  Recall the political support function 
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Holding constant the amount transferred to each group, Ti, and expenditures per member, ei, the effect of an 
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The first component on the right hand side is the scale effect, which measures the change in the 
productivity of expenditures as expenditures increase.  More members, holding constant the level of 
expenditures per member, means greater total expenditures on political pressure for any given policy.  The 
scale effect can be either positive or negative.  It is positive if expenditures exhibit increasing returns to 
scale, and negative if they exhibit decreasing returns to scale.  The second component on the right hand 
side is the free riding effect.  The free riding effect is unambiguously negative due to free riding, which 
arises because each member of the group has an incentive to do nothing and simply rely on the other 
members to expend resources toward the production of political pressure.   
The net effect of an increase in the size of an interest group is ambiguous.  However, if the group 
is sufficiently small, a modest increase in its size is likely to raise the marginal product of expenditures on 
political support, since free riding is better managed in small groups and because economies of scale are 
likely to be positive when expenditures are relatively low (Becker, 1983).  Therefore, when a small group 
experiences a modest increase in its members, the marginal benefit due to a larger scale is likely to exceed 
the marginal cost due to more free riding, increasing the marginal productivity of expenditures.  Eventually, 
as the group continues to expand, the marginal productivity of expenditures falls since free riding becomes 
unwieldy and diminishing returns to scale become more important (Becker, 1983). 
 More developed stock markets tend to have more numerous “outsider” constituencies.  Thus, if the 
scale effect outweighs the free riding effect, the productivity of “outsiders’” expenditures on political 
support increase as a country’s stock market grows and becomes more liquid.  A productivity enhancing 
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The marginal support curve shifts upward, resulting in a more restrictive equilibrium insider trading policy. 
 
 
b) The Effect of a Change in the Productivity of Political Expenditures 
 
An exogenous change in the “technology” of political support or opposition, i.e., a group’s ability 
to translate its expenditures into political support or opposition changes the productivity of political 
expenditures.  A group may become “more efficient at producing pressure, perhaps because of greater 
success at controlling free riding or at using television and other media.”  (Becker, 1983, p. 379).  In the 
context of stock market regulations, for example, the emergence of investor advocacy groups may represent 
a “technological” advance that increases the productivity of expenditures on lobbying for more stringent 
insider trading rules and enforcement.  These groups provide an important mechanism for the articulation 
of the interests of dispersed shareholders.  Similarly, institutional investors may help to overcome free 
riding problems and thus increase the productivity of expenditures in support of stronger investor 
protections. 
A “technological” advance increasing the productivity of support for insider trading regulation 
shifts the marginal support curve upward, implying greater support for regulatory intervention at any given 






3) Incorporating the Public Interest 
 
Many economic models of regulation consider private interests as the sole determinants of 
regulatory policy.  However, Becker’s (1983) model of interest group competition reconciles the public and 
private interest approaches.  In Becker’s model, an interest group has an inherent disadvantage in the 
competition for political influence if the policy that it favors is socially inefficient, i.e., if the social cost of 
its favored policy is greater than its social benefit.  Opponents of a socially inefficient policy have an 
inherent advantage in challenging it.i   
If insider trading legislation raises social efficiency, “outsiders” have an inherent advantage in 
pushing for tougher insider trading laws and enforcement.  This is represented graphically as a shift in 
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Conversely, if insider trading legislation lowers social efficiency, “insiders” have an inherent 
advantage in opposing tougher insider trading laws and enforcement.  This is represented graphically as a 
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